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Licensing Knowledge
Claudia E. Haupt*
When professionals give advice, they disseminate professional
knowledge to their clients. Professional advice is valuable to clients
because they gain access to a body of knowledge they do not otherwise
possess. To preserve the accuracy, and hence the value, of this knowledge
transfer, the First Amendment should protect professional speech
against state interference that seeks to alter the content of professional
advice in a way that contradicts professional knowledge. But before
professionals can give professional advice, they are routinely subject to
licensing by the state. This seemingly creates a tension between state
involvement in professional licensing and protection against state
involvement in professional speech.
This Article provides a theoretical framework to reconcile
professional speech protection with professional licensing. Under this
theory, the interests underlying First Amendment protection of
professional speech and those underlying state licensing are the same:
preserving the reliability of expert knowledge by guarding professionals’
competence and protecting the dissemination of reliable professional
advice to the client.
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INTRODUCTION
Professional licensing is under attack. Before professionals may
dispense advice to their clients, they routinely have to obtain a license
to practice, subjecting them to state regulation. But efforts to
deregulate professional licensing that enlist the First Amendment as a
new deregulatory weapon of choice are underway.1 These challenges
have created marked judicial disagreement on the First Amendment
implications of licensing,2 reflecting the underdeveloped theoretical
basis of professional advice-giving.
1.
Cf. David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation: A Brighter
Future Ahead?, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 287, 289 n.9 (2016) (“An emerging issue . . . is whether the
First Amendment provides robust protection against occupational restrictions that impinge on
freedom of speech . . . .”); Clark Neily, Beating Rubber-Stamps into Gavels: A Fresh Look at
Occupational Freedom, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 304, 306 (2016) (arguing that “increased skepticism
toward the rational basis test, and the collision of occupational licensing with more highly
scrutinized realms of speech regulation and antitrust, have created both opportunities and an
inclination for judges to reconsider the traditional evaluation of occupational licensing”).
2.
Compare Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
D.C. tour guide licensing requirement to violate the First Amendment), with Kagan v. City of New
Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1403 (2015) (holding New
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Professional speech should receive robust First Amendment
protection. Dispensing professional advice within the professionalclient relationship ought to remain free from state interference that
seeks to prescribe its content in a way that contradicts professional
knowledge. A doctor’s advice, for example, should reflect the insights of
the medical profession rather than a state legislature’s opposing view.3
I have argued elsewhere that the First Amendment provides a shield
against such state interference.4 At the same time, state licensing
remains an important regulatory tool to prevent “quacks” from giving
bad advice.5
The new First Amendment–based attacks on licensing suggest
that a tension exists between state regulation of the professions and
speech protection. Permitting state involvement in licensing while at
the same time prohibiting intrusive state involvement in professional
speech presents a puzzle that this Article addresses in its theoretical
and doctrinal dimensions. So doing, it articulates a defense of
professional licensing against First Amendment challenges and
reconciles licensing with robust First Amendment protection for
professional speech.

Orleans tour guide licensing requirement to be permissible under the First Amendment). See also
Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 365–70 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that the provision of the
Psychologists’ Licensing Act governing “psychological services to individuals, groups,
organizations, or the public” was an overbroad restriction on free speech as related to offers to
provide such services without commercial purpose); Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1197–98 (11th
Cir. 2011) (upholding Florida licensing requirement for interior designers against First
Amendment challenge); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding California licensing requirement for
mental health professionals against First Amendment challenge).
3.
See, e.g., Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be
Reversible, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1DpDo0Q [https://perma.cc/7MHN-W55A]
(“Arizona . . . became the first state to pass a law requiring doctors who perform drug-induced
abortions to tell women that the procedure may be reversible, an assertion that most doctors say
is wrong.”); see also Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the recordkeeping, inquiry and antiharassment provisions of the Florida Firearm
Owners’ Privacy Act violated the First Amendment and that the antidiscrimination provision was
constitutional). But see Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th
Cir. 2012) (upholding a state law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking an abortion of an
increased risk of suicide to obtain informed consent).
4.
See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016) (offering
a theory of First Amendment protection for professional speech based on an understanding of the
professions as knowledge communities).
5.
Id. at 1277–84 (discussing licensing as permissible regulation).
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Courts6 and scholars7 have linked First Amendment questions
of professional speech protection to the permissibility of licensing. What
is still missing from the debate, however, is a firm theoretical basis to
defend professional licensing against deregulatory undertakings that
seek to enlist the First Amendment in an effort to curb state regulation
of commercial—including professional—activities.
A theory of professional speech based on an understanding of the
professions as knowledge communities aligns the interests underlying
professional speech protection from state interference on the one hand
and those underlying state involvement in professional licensing on the
other. The respective interests, I submit, are the same: preserving the
reliability of expert knowledge by guarding professionals’ competence,
and protecting the dissemination of reliable professional advice to the
client. Therefore, the First Amendment cannot in a theoretically and
doctrinally coherent manner be used as a deregulatory device against
professional licensing.
This Article plays out against the larger jurisprudential
backdrop that is the current debate over the deregulatory use of the
First Amendment in pursuit of a laissez faire, Lochner-style market.8
6.
See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375
(2018):
All that is required to make something a “profession,” according to these courts, is that
it involves personalized services and requires a professional license from the State. But
that gives the States unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by
simply imposing a licensing requirement. States cannot choose the protection that
speech receives under the First Amendment, as that would give them a powerful tool to
impose “invidious discrimination of disfavored subjects.;
King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 319 (D.N.J. 2013):
[T]here is a more fundamental problem with [the argument that professional counseling
is speech], because taken to its logical end, it would mean that any regulation of
professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First Amendment free
speech rights, and therefore would need to withstand heightened scrutiny to be
permissible. Such a result runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state
generally may enact laws rationally regulating professionals, including those providing
medicine and mental health services.
7.
See, e.g., Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000) (discussing licensing as a regulation of professional
advice); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 165 (2015) (discussing the use of licensing to regulate occupational speech); Vikram Amar,
Licensing Regulations Are Not a Free-Speech Issue, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/20/when-do-doctors-have-the-right-to-speak/
licensing-regulations-are-not-a-free-speech-issue [https://perma.cc/H5VZ-TL6F] (arguing that
professional licensing regulations should not trigger review under the First Amendment).
8.
See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2460 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority has chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment
into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct.
at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Using the First Amendment to strike down economic and social
laws . . . will, for the American public, obscure, not clarify, the true value of protecting freedom of
speech.”); see also C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J.
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In the professional context in particular, such developments would be
extremely problematic. In contrast to the commercial realm, where the
free flow of information is at stake, professionals deal in a specific kind
of information—namely, advice based on professional knowledge.9
What is good professional advice, in turn, is determined by the
knowledge community rather than the market.10 Thus, even if the First
Amendment were to justify deregulation in the commercial context
generally11—which I doubt, but will not explore within the confines of

981, 990–94 (2009) (arguing that commercial speech should be subject to regulation due to its
relation to market transactions); Julie Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1119, 1157–58 (2015) (describing how the First Amendment has been used to advance
economic interests); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2583, 2588 (2008) (arguing against the expansive protection of commercial speech, especially
as applied to for-profit corporations); Post & Shanor, supra note 7, at 167 (“[T]he First Amendment
has become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation.”); Robert Post, The Constitutional
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“Nothing could be more damaging to
the First Amendment than to equate it with a specific economic perspective, and in this way to
transform it into a mere “basis for reviewing economic regulations.”); Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 137 (“Courts’ growing protection of commercial speech threatens
to revive a sort of Lochnerian constitutional economic deregulation . . . .”); Morgan N. Weiland,
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1454 (2017) (“By conceptualizing corporate and listeners’ interests as
aligned because both benefit from deregulation, the Court has developed a tradition in which
corporate interests are always vindicated while listeners’ interests are not.”). But see Jonathan H.
Adler, Persistent Threats to Commercial Speech, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 289, 316 (2016) (“[C]ommercial
speech can pose a threat to established economic interests . . . .”); Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E.
Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 378 (2017) (arguing that broad
First Amendment protections are important in the marketplace).
Indicative of a larger trend, scholars explore the Lochnerization of the First Amendment
beyond commercial speech. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 572 (2015) (“[R]enewed focus in conservative political thought on
limiting government interference in the marketplace has begun to affect mainstream conservative
legal thought.”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2016) (explaining that First Amendment Lochnerism has affected “campaign
financiers, food and drug companies, right-to-work activists, and religious employers”); Elizabeth
Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2015) (“[C]ourts increasingly
incorporate the central premises of Lochner into religious liberty doctrine.”). For a popular press
account, see Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June
30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2ID0Wov [https://perma.cc/9HKG-YD4S] (“Conservative groups . . . have
used the First Amendment to justify unlimited campaign spending, discrimination against gay
couples and attacks on the regulation of tobacco, pharmaceuticals and guns.”).
9.
Cf. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1283 (stating that the First Amendment may be used to
protect “the individual professional’s opinion”).
10. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 678
(2017) (“The advice-giving function of the individual professional is thus tied back to the range of
defensible opinions within the knowledge community.”).
11. For competing views, see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 295 (advocating for “[t]he right to
pursue an occupation free from arbitrary government action”); Neily, supra note 1, at 312
(criticizing “the dubious jurisprudential foundation upon which the occupational licensing doctrine
rests”); and Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
314, 314 (2016) (“[T]he Constitution is increasingly being invoked as a trump against certain types
of economic regulation.”).
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this Article—the underlying considerations, as I will argue here, do not
apply in the professional context.
In making that argument, this Article unpacks the distinctive
nature of professional speech. Several key features distinguish
professional speech from speech in public discourse and from
commercial speech.12 Professional speech takes place within the
confines of the professional-client relationship. In light of the
characteristics defining this social relationship, two strands of current
First Amendment scholarship concerning questions of listener interests
and speaker equality are especially salient. Both constitute the flip side
of dominant First Amendment theory as it applies to public discourse,
and both remain generally underexplored even though they are of
foundational importance in the context of professional speech.
The predominant perspective in First Amendment doctrine
tends to focus primarily on speaker interests.13 But in the professional
context, this focus is misplaced. Likewise, there is a strong presumption
of speaker equality that pervades our understanding of the First
Amendment.14 The reasons underlying professional speech protection,
however, run counter to these assumptions. The very purpose of
professional speech is to provide useful advice to the client. A focus
solely on the speaker is misguided because within the professionalclient relationship, the perspective of the listener—who receives access
to knowledge from the speaker—is essential.15 Moreover, the
professional deploying her expert knowledge within the professionalclient relationship affirmatively is not equal to other, nonprofessional
speakers, and her professional advice is therefore not to be regarded as

12. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1254–58 (distinguishing professional speech from private
speech in public discourse and from government speech); id. at 1264–68 (distinguishing
professional speech and commercial speech).
13. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 52 (2016) (“Many think of the First Amendment as
safeguarding the interests of speakers, especially the lonely individual speaker of conscience.”);
Post & Shanor, supra note 7, at 170 (“Ordinary First Amendment doctrine . . . focuses on the rights
of speakers, not listeners.”).
14. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32 (2015) (invalidating municipal
sign ordinance and holding that content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (striking down restrictions of independent
political expenditures based on the identity of the speaker, stating that “the First Amendment
generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity”); see also
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, at xi (2012) (“We have interpreted the First Amendment
to mean that every person has an equal right to speak as he or she thinks right.”).
15. Cf. Norton, supra note 13, at 83 (discussing “professionals’ speech to their patients” as a
listener-centered relationship and asserting that “a listener-centered approach supports the
protection of speech in these relationships that furthers listeners’ First Amendment interests,
while permitting the regulation of speech that frustrates those interests”).
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just another opinion.16 These considerations make the First
Amendment a poor vehicle to challenge professional licensing. In fact,
quite to the contrary, the justifications underlying professional
licensing and professional speech protection, as the remainder of this
Article demonstrates, largely align.
To be clear, the argument is not that the First Amendment
requires professional licensing as a constitutional matter.17 Rather, the
argument is that the First Amendment does not prohibit professional
licensing. It thus cannot be used as a tool against state regulation that
requires professionals to be licensed. The constitutional basis for such
regulations comfortably rests in the police powers of the states.18
Doctrinally, these regulations are thus subject to rational basis review
rather than First Amendment strict scrutiny or, under the commercial
speech doctrine, intermediate scrutiny.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the traditional
justifications for state licensing and presents the main critiques of these
justifications, including critiques based on economic interests,
character and fitness, and competence. On closer inspection, they are
best understood as efforts to recalibrate existing licensing regimes. This
Part then highlights the new, First Amendment–based critique of
licensing that raises the stakes significantly by questioning the
constitutionality of licensing. Finally, it addresses the object of licensing
and concludes that ensuring the professional’s competence to serve the
client’s interests within the professional-client advice-giving
relationship is the most relevant basis for licensing.

16. Note that the existence of a professional-client relationship is key. See POST, supra note
14, at 44 (“Within public discourse, traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically
transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”).
17. Licensing of clergy, in particular the jailing of Baptist ministers in Virginia for preaching
without licenses, is at the root of religious freedom in the United States. See Michael McConnell,
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2119–20 (2003); id. at 2164–65 (discussing England’s Act of Toleration, which
expanded the right to preach freely in the American colonies and served as a precursor to the First
Amendment). The clergy is generally considered one of the three paradigmatic professions,
alongside law and medicine. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1248–49. However, in light of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment, I explicitly exclude the clergy from my discussion.
A different rationale for excluding the clergy is given by Walter Gellhorn, who notes: “After
examining the roster of who must receive official permission to function, a cynic might conclude
that virtually the only people who remain unlicensed in at least one of the United States are
clergymen and university professors, presumably because they are nowhere taken seriously.”
Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1976).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (police power extends “to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all
property within the State”).
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Part II offers a descriptive-analytical account of the specific
character of expert knowledge. Drawing on insights from sociology and
science and technology studies—fields traditionally concerned with
understanding knowledge and the professions—it provides an
assessment of the sociological reality of how knowledge is produced and
disseminated by professionals and thus made useful to clients. So doing,
it first explores the distinction between information and knowledge. It
then turns to the societal role of expert knowledge communicated
through professional advice. Expert knowledge is based on inequality
between professionals and nonprofessionals, and hence might be
considered fundamentally “undemocratic.” Yet, this very characteristic
makes professional knowledge—and professional advice based on it—
valuable to the client and, by extension, to society at large. Exploring
these knowledge-centered societal benefits, it offers a perspective
traditionally underexplored in First Amendment theory.19
Part III shifts to a normative perspective, considering more fully
the specific interests at stake. It examines listener interests and
speaker inequality within the professional-client relationship as
features distinctive from public discourse and in contrast to the
normative assumptions underlying public discourse. It then turns to the
normative dimension of speaker inequality, bringing the First
Amendment values underlying professional speech into conversation
with the values underlying the fiduciary relationship between
professionals and clients. Because fiduciary duties are anathema to our
understanding of public discourse, they remain generally overlooked in
First Amendment theory.20
Part IV offers a reassessment of professional licensing in light of
the concept of the professions as knowledge communities along two
axes. First, it demonstrates from a First Amendment perspective that
professional licensing and the values underlying speech protection align
in the interest of ensuring competence. It outlines the doctrinal
implications of the theory and its interactions with the professional
advice-giving framework. Second, it argues that the states’ police
powers offer ample room for recalibrating existing professional

19. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 902 (2010)
(“Yet although factual truth is important, surprisingly little of the free speech tradition is
addressed directly to the question of the relationship between a regime of freedom of speech and
the goal of increasing public knowledge of facts or decreasing public belief in false factual
propositions.”). One notable exception is Post’s theory of expertise and democracy, see POST, supra
note 14, upon which my analysis builds, see infra Section II.C.
20. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1217 (2016) (“This is the opposite of the model of independent, autonomous individuals
presupposed by the model of public discourse.”).
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licensing regimes in light of the interplay of professional expertise,
public expectations, and the interest in harm avoidance.
The First Amendment, to borrow loosely from Alexander
Meiklejohn, “is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.”21
Regulating the professions through professional licensing requirements
does not contradict the values served by the First Amendment in the
professional context. Ultimately, the juxtaposition of professional
licensing and the First Amendment in antilicensing litigation is
strategically innovative but theoretically unsound. There may be good
reasons to question the scope and design of current professional
licensing requirements. But the First Amendment poses no
constitutional barrier to professional licensing.
I. PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Processes of professionalization bring with them the advent of
licensing regimes. Whether among lawyers in medieval England,22
physicians in eighteenth-century Germany,23 or across various
professional groups in the United States,24 professionalization
generates exclusive claims to expertise, which in turn routinely results
in calls for state intervention to establish admissions regulations or
licensing regimes.25
We live in an era of ever-expanding professional licensing.26
That general trend, to be sure, is not particularly new. Henry
21. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27
(1948).
22. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (“[O]ne sees the adoption of competence and character
based admission standards . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., Thomas Broman, Rethinking Professionalization: Theory, Practice, and
Professional Ideology in Eighteenth-Century German Medicine, 67 J. MOD. HIST. 835, 858–62
(1995) (claiming that licensing brought “a new sense of professionalism” to the medical profession);
id. at 839 (“Most significant . . . was the creation of state medical boards . . . which established a
separate licensing examination for admission to medical practice.”).
24. See, e.g., Harold J. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. SOC. 137,
137 (1964) (stating that the U.S. “labor force as a whole is in one way or another becoming
professionalized”).
25. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 11 (“[R]estricting access is the real purpose, and not
merely a side effect, of many if not most successful campaigns to institute licensing schemes”);
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.
L. REV. 157, 166 (1961) (“[T]he prime impetus for the creation of a state board to administer
standards for entry into an occupation emanates from the occupational group itself . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Job Licenses in Spotlight as Uber Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27,
2015), http://nyti.ms/1zt0vHe [https://perma.cc/8GWL-YJNS] (reporting on various studies of
licensing, including Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION: HAMILTON PROJECT (Mar. 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBZ6-LFUV]; and Dick M. Carpenter
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Monaghan noted in an article published in 1961: “The continuous
growth of the occupational license as a method for restricting entry into
an occupation is, in its own way, an arresting social phenomenon.
Occupation after occupation is withdrawn from unrestricted access by
requiring a license as a prerequisite to entrance.”27 But a half century
later, the scope far exceeds previous licensing requirements.
By serving as a prerequisite to practicing one’s occupation,
licensing constitutes a “significant control over free occupational
entry.”28 Only those individuals who exhibit “a certain minimum
proficiency” receive licenses. This mechanism necessarily means that
there is no unlimited access to professions subject to licensing.29 And
although unlimited entry may be justifiably rejected for some
professions based on certain prerequisites of expertise,30 limiting entry
may also be designed to exclude otherwise qualified individuals. On this
point, a parallel reading of the Slaughter-House Cases31 and Bradwell v.
Illinois32 is instructive.

II, Lisa Knepper, Angela C. Erickson & John K. Ross, License to Work: A National Study of Burdens
from Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUST. (May 2012), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/04/licensetowork1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NKR-Q63E].
27. Monaghan, supra note 25, at 164; see also Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 6:
Possibly the founding fathers knew of restrictions in some of the new American states
on the practices of law and medicine. They would, however, have been aghast to learn
that in many parts of this country today aspiring bee keepers, embalmers, lightning rod
salesmen, septic tank cleaners, taxidermists, and tree surgeons must obtain official
approval before seeking the public’s patronage.
(footnote omitted).
28. Monaghan, supra note 25, at 158.
29. Id.
30. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (upholding licensing requirement to
practice medicine, concluding that “[t]he law of West Virginia was intended to secure such skill
and learning in the profession of medicine that the community might trust with confidence those
receiving a license under authority of the state”); see also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 169–70
(1923) (upholding licensing requirement for dentists).
31. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (defining extent of police powers).
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (rejecting challenge of qualified female applicant’s
denial of a license to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment). The concurrence elaborates:
It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason,
and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings
demanding special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the
State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission
of woman, it is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions,
and callings shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those
energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to
predominate in the sterner sex.
Id. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Licensing requirements are based on the states’ police powers to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,33 and they are
routinely justified by invoking protection of the public as the underlying
rationale. The rationales for regulation across professions are similar,
though they are not typically “precisely the same as those underlying
many typical forms of health, safety, and economic regulation.”34 That
is to say, the “protecting the public” rationale for professional licensing
can be fuzzy. One important consequence is that licensing regimes are
often insufficiently calibrated. An improved approach would move away
from the generic “protecting the public” rationale toward a more clearly
defined and justified regulatory objective: ensuring the reliability of
expert knowledge for the benefit of the client by ascertaining the
competence of the professional advice-giver and tying the professional’s
advice to the body of knowledge generated by the professional
knowledge community.35 But that does not mean that licensing is not—
and ought not be—permissible.
A. Traditional Justifications for Professional Licensing
The Supreme Court noted in 1889 in Dent v. West Virginia: “No
one has a right to practice medicine without having the necessary
qualifications of learning and skill; and the statute only requires that
whoever assumes, by offering the community his services as a
physician, that he possess such learning and skill, shall present
evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by the
state as competent to judge of his qualifications.”36 Expertise and
licensing are thus coupled.
In the context of legal advice, while acknowledging the need for
affordable access to legal services, the American Bar Association’s
(“ABA”) position regarding nonlawyer providers has rejected “open[ing]
the practice of law to unschooled, unregulated nonlawyers” primarily
with a view to potential “grave harm to clients.”37 Though many legal

33. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191 (1898) (concerning medical licenses);
Dent, 129 U.S. at 122 (discussing medical licensing “conditions imposed by the state for the
protection of society”).
34. Rose, supra note 22, at 3 (focusing on the legal profession).
35. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1248–54 (explaining the role of professional knowledge
communities).
36. 129 U.S. at 123.
37. Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2607 (2014) (quoting
William T. Robinson, Legal Help for the Poor: The View from the A.B.A., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/legal-help-for-the-poor-the-view-from-the-aba.html
[https://perma.cc/VG5H-JCX9]).
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issues may look fairly straightforward, they likely “involve myriad legal
rights and responsibilities. If the case is not handled by a professional
with appropriate legal training, a person can suffer serious long-term
consequences . . .”38
This justification seems fairly intuitive, and it is easily
translatable to other professions. It also resonates with the public’s
expectations toward providers of professional services. As one observer
remarked,
Sometimes professional licenses make sense, ensuring decent standards of health and
safety. I’m reassured that if I ever need brain surgery, the doctor performing it will have
been recognized by the profession to be up to the task. We don’t want to return to the 19th
century, when barbers pulled teeth and freelance doctors with no certification peddled
miraculous cures.39

Accordingly, states establish licensing systems for various
professions. When challenged, courts have upheld them by relying on
traditional justifications. Consider, for example, National Ass’n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology,
decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2000.40
The state of California has regulated psychology as a profession since
1958.41 Initially, only the title “psychologist” was protected, but there
was no definition of what “the practice of psychology” entailed.42 In light
of “the actual and potential consumer harm that can result from the
unlicensed, unqualified or incompetent practice of psychology,”
however, the state created the Psychology Licensing Law.43 The state
legislature relied on the state’s police powers, reasoning “that the
practice of psychology in California affect[ed] the public health, safety,
and welfare and [was] to be subject to regulation and control in the
public interest to protect the public from the unauthorized and
unqualified practice of psychology.”44
The statute defines the profession,45 sets forth a licensing
requirement, and defines the services rendered.46 It also establishes
certain educational requirements as a prerequisite for obtaining a
license.47 Moreover, the statute allows other professionals to engage in
38. Id.
39. Porter, supra note 26.
40. 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000).
41. Id. at 1047.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting CAL. BD. OF PSYCHOLOGY, SUNSET REVIEW REPORT).
44. Id. (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2900 (West 2018)).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. (summarizing education, work experience, and admissions exam requirements for
licensing).
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“work of a psychological nature consistent with the laws governing their
respective professions” as long as “they do not hold themselves out to
the public as psychologists.”48 At issue in this particular case were
provisions concerning psychoanalysts.49 Several individuals and an
organization, not licensed under California law but intending to
practice psychoanalysis in California, challenged the licensing scheme
on Fourteenth and First Amendment grounds.50 The Ninth Circuit held
that it was constitutional under both.51
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process and equal protection challenge, the court held “that there is no
fundamental right to choose a mental health professional with specific
training.”52 Since the licensing requirement “neither utilizes a suspect
classification nor implicates a fundamental right,” the court subjected
it to rational basis review.53 Plaintiffs argued that there was no rational
basis to require additional training prerequisites in order to obtain a
license, that there was no rational basis for exempting certain
professionals, and that the entire licensing scheme was “unnecessary
and ineffective” and overly restrictive.54 The court rejected all of these
arguments and in so doing made the—in light of contemporary
developments, perhaps overconfident55—observation that “the Lochner
era has long passed.”56
Regarding the First Amendment challenge, the plaintiffs argued
that psychoanalysis—the “talking cure”—is pure speech and as such
deserves First Amendment protection.57 The court, however, noted that
the state’s police power allows regulation and licensing of professionals,
particularly when issues of public health and safety are involved.58
The professions discussed so far—medicine, law, and
psychology—suggest an important connection between the
permissibility of a licensing requirement and the nature of the
occupational activity to be regulated.59 There is a broad range of
48. Id. at 1047–48.
49. See id. (outlining criteria for psychoanalysts and research psychoanalysts).
50. Id. at 1048–49.
51. Id. at 1056.
52. Id. at 1050.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1051.
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the Lochnerization of the First
Amendment).
56. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1051 (citing Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
57. Id. at 1054.
58. Id.
59. Moreover, the medical services sector accounts in large part for the increase in licensing
requirements. See Kleiner, supra note 26, at 7.
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occupations, and pinning down the exact reason why licensing is likely
indispensable for some, debatable for others, and perhaps unnecessary
for the rest is a vexing issue. As one commentator notes:
It is one thing to require a great deal of training and government certification for someone
to work as a physician or attorney—occupations where the well-being of the public can
reasonably be thought to be at stake. It is quite another for potential florists, African hairbraiders, or casket-sellers—all of whom have sued over occupational restrictions, and
none of whom present risks to public well-being—to face expensive, time-consuming and
broadly unreasonable barriers to entry.60

Whether this broad assertion of harmlessness is descriptively accurate
is questionable.61 It is also important to note that outlier cases should
not dictate the overall approach to licensing.62
One key consideration is potential harm to clients resulting from
bad advice. Thus, Richard Posner ties “the professional’s capacity to
harm society” to the belief that entry into the profession “should be
controlled by the government: that not only should the title of
‘physician,’ ‘lawyer,’ etcetera be reserved for people who satisfy the
profession’s own criteria for entry to the profession, but no one should
be allowed to perform the services performed by the members of the
profession without a license from the government.”63 Whatever the
debates are at the margins, the theoretical point is most clearly
conveyed with respect to these paradigmatic advice-giving professions
where, from the client’s perspective, both the value of good advice and
the potential harm caused by bad advice are especially great.

60. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 297–98. Even critics of licensing acknowledge such differences
among professions. See, e.g., Kevin Dayranta, Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John O’Shea, Reforming
American Medical Licensure, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 241–42 (2019) (asserting that
“occupational licensing regulations are not always necessary, and in most fields are far too onerous
to be justified on informational asymmetry grounds” but acknowledging that “medicine is
inherently different from most other fields”). But see Shirley V. Svorny, Beyond Medical Licensure:
Is Licensing More Important for Doctors than for Interior Decorators or Hair Braiders?, HEALTH &
MED., Spring 2015, at 26, 27, [hereinafter Svorny, Beyond Medical Licensure]
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2015/3/regulation-v38n1-6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TYQ7-99NP] (“There are people who seriously dispute the need for some form of
professional regulation of health care providers . . . .”); Shirley Svorny, End State Licensing of
Physicians, CATO INST. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/end-statelicensing-physicians [https://perma.cc/5BVZ-QNJJ] (arguing against physician licensing).
61. See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, The Braiding Cases, Cultural Deference, and the Inadequate
Protection of Black Women Consumers, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 125, 140–43 (2007) (disputing
the characterization of braiding as “harmless” and discussing potential harms).
62. See, e.g., Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank A. Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism:
Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 309,
312 (“Commentators all too often extrapolate from horror stories to make claims about the entirety
of licensing . . . .”).
63. Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
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B. Standard Critiques
Scholars and advocates have long criticized professional
licensing for several reasons. Most prominent among these criticisms is
the assertion that licensing improperly enshrines professionals’
economic interests. Moreover, licensing allegedly creates specious
character and fitness requirements and insufficiently ensures
competence. More recently, a new line of attack has emerged that raises
the stakes considerably. First Amendment challenges to licensing are
framed as “occupational freedom” cases explicitly based on economic
considerations. By attempting to raise the level of scrutiny under which
professional licensing is reviewed—from rational basis review of
economic regulation to a higher level of scrutiny under the First
Amendment64—these challenges cast licensing as constitutionally
suspect.
Whereas the previous critiques are best understood as primarily
aimed at tailoring existing regimes to better fit the goals of licensing,
the First Amendment critique introduces a constitutional dimension.
After briefly surveying the previous critiques, it is the First
Amendment–based deregulatory claim that this Article primarily
contends with.
1. Economic Interests
Licensing limits access to the profession. It therefore arguably
may be used in an anticompetitive manner to protect the economic
interests of professionals against both potential outside competitors
seeking entry into the profession and those within the group itself.65
Contemporary economic criticism of professional licensing spans a wide
political spectrum. The Obama administration called for a reduction of
“unnecessary occupation licenses”;66 the Clinton campaign in 2016
likewise embraced the reduction of licensing.67 The Hamilton Project at
64. See infra notes 128–132 and accompanying text.
65. Monaghan, supra note 25, at 164.
66. Press Release, Obama White House, Fact Sheet: New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary
Occupation Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages (June 17, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-new-steps-reduceunnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting [https://perma.cc/2HBQ-LJGZ]; see also DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 45–46 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U29Z-2W5Q] (encouraging states to reduce the burdens of professional
regulations).
67. Jeanne Sahadi, Hillary Clinton’s New Plan to Help Small Business Owners, CNN BUS.
(Aug. 23, 2016, 2:17 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/23/news/economy/hillary-clintonsmall-business/index.html [https://perma.cc/KKC5-R8C2].
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the Brookings Institution released a report on licensing reform.68
Libertarian groups have spearheaded current antilicensing litigation
efforts.69 Official statements from the Trump administration do not
seem to be readily available, but as then-governor of Indiana, Vice
President Mike Pence vetoed a number of licensing requirements for
professions, including diabetes counselors, anesthesiologist assistants,
and dietitians.70
Is licensing merely an access control mechanism that serves a
profession’s economic interests by excluding newcomers? To pick just
one example, critics have charged the legal profession with economic
protectionism since the Great Depression, when it first began
restricting the unauthorized practice of law. 71 The profession, however,
has denied that protecting its economic interests motivated the
restrictions placed on legal practice. 72 Complicating the picture, claims
to expertise are intertwined with claims to authority that may be
inseparable from economic interests.73 As Monaghan puts it,
“ ‘Competency,’ then, may be but a euphemism for economic control of
the trade group.”74 Historically, as critics of licensing readily
acknowledge,75 concerns for health and public safety provided the basis
for regulation.76 Tracing the origins of state medical boards, scholars
note that “private medical associations pushed state legislators to adopt
laws regulating the practice of medicine.”77 Physicians favored
legislation protecting their market share from “irregulars” and
“quacks.”78 Such laws advance economic interests, but whether they
were the primary impetus or whether patient safety was the main
concern remains contested among historians.79 Regardless of motive,
the ensuing state regulation of medical practice was, “as a matter of
68. Kleiner, supra note 26; Ryan Nunn, The Future of Occupational Licensing Reform,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-future-ofoccupational-licensing-reform/ [https://perma.cc/D7WY-BL83].
69. See Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/
occupational-licensing (last updated July 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/47UQ-2JYK] (“[O]ccupational
licenses, which are essentially permission slips from the government, routinely stand in the way
of honest enterprise.”).
70. See Kleiner, supra note 26, at 5.
71. Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing to Protect Consumers, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2693 (2014).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 25, at 167.
74. Id. at 165.
75. See, e.g., Kleiner, supra note 26, at 12.
76. Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 290 (2010).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/31/2019 1:27 AM

LICENSING KNOWLEDGE

517

law, clearly adopted pursuant to the legislative authority to protect
public health and safety.”80
Excavating some of the assumptions underlying the market in
professional services helps assess whether licensing merely creates
barriers to entry or whether it serves a public interest in ensuring
competence—or both. Two familiar positions compete. On the one hand,
critics of licensing contend that occupational licensing has
overwhelmingly negative effects. It creates barriers to entry and
restricts employment in licensed occupations, drives up prices, and
limits economic opportunity.81 This results in reduced employment and
increased prices and wages rather than better quality and safety.82
Licensing under this view restricts upward mobility for lower-income
individuals who seek occupational licensing83 and geographic mobility
for higher-income individuals due to differing eligibility requirements
across licensing jurisdictions for highly skilled occupations such as
medical and legal professionals.84 Moreover, consumers may not benefit
from licensing. Whereas prices have arguably risen and economic
output declined, critics of licensing suggest that the quality of services
may not have improved as a result of licensing.85
On the other hand, scholars answer complaints that licensing
raises prices without increasing the quality of services and blocks
competitors from entering the market unless they fulfill certain
training and testing requirements by pointing out that “each of these
objections is not sufficiently theorized, justified, or empirically
grounded” to support deregulatory interventions.86 Anecdotal “horror
stories” of outlier cases (such as “falconers, ferret breeders, and palm
readers,” “beekeepers and taxidermists,” and “cosmetologists and
florists”87) provide an insufficient empirical basis.88 The argument
articulated by critics of licensing also points to larger problems within
antitrust doctrine which insufficiently accounts for “the societal value
of occupational licensure or professional standards. Instead, it reflects
80. Id.
81. See Kleiner, supra note 26, at 6 (“[B]y making it more difficult to enter an occupation,
licensing can affect employment in licensed occupations, wages of licensed works, the prices for
their services, and worker economic opportunity more broadly.”).
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 13; see also David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential
Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 117–22 (2017) (discussing how “licensing requirements limit
interstate mobility”).
85. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 6.
86. Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 62, at 3.
87. Id. at 3, 5.
88. Id. at 5.
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mainstream economics’ bias against occupational licensure and a more
general belief that government is the principal obstacle to competitive
markets.”89
Whether one subscribes to one or the other of the two models of
the professional-services market has a significant impact on one’s view
of professional licensing. It directly influences answers to fundamental
and enduring questions, such as whether the professions are ordinary
businesses. At a high enough level of abstraction, professionals’
economic activities may not fundamentally differ from other
commercial endeavors. For example, as Bradley Wendel points out,
“The legal profession has always been rhetorically committed to the
distinction between a business and a profession.”90
Thus, economic arguments for and against licensing exist. A
system solely grounded in economic protectionism would certainly not
justify a licensing regime91—but things are more complicated than that.
Without resolving the conflict between different market models for
professional services, the upshot is that economic considerations do not
pose an insurmountable obstacle to imposing licensing requirements.
However, different segments of the professional services market may be
better regulated by more differentiated licensing regimes.
2. Character and Fitness
Deborah Rhode observes in her seminal article on the topic that
“[m]oral character as a professional credential has an extended
historical lineage.”92 Professional licensing is routinely tied to
evaluations of the applicant’s moral character and fitness. For the legal
profession, “the requirement dates to the Roman Theodesian Code, and
its Anglo-American roots reach to thirteenth-century England.”93 In the
medical context, the Supreme Court noted in the 1898 case Hawker v.
New York that “[c]haracter is as important a qualification as
89. Id. at 2.
90. W. Bradley Wendel, The Profession’s Monopoly and Its Core Values, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2563, 2566 (2014); see also Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 741 (1988).
91. Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1105 (2015) (“Limits on
state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to
active market participants, for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor
and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an
axiom of federal antitrust policy.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (“The fact
that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield
that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”).
92. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 493
(1985).
93. Id.
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knowledge, and if the legislature may properly require a definite course
of instruction, or a certain examination as to learning, it may with equal
propriety prescribe what evidence of good character shall be
furnished.”94
In the United States, all state bars require “certification of
character” as a condition for admission to practice law.95 The same is
true in most other nations and for most other licensed professions.96 At
the same time, moral character requirements evoke a bygone era in
which they served as an attempt at establishing “distinctiveness”
absent a claim to special expertise.97 And despite their long history, the
requirements remain fuzzy and exceedingly difficult to objectively
assess.98 Rhode explains:

94. 170 U.S. 189, 194 (1898) (upholding retroactive application of law prohibiting medical
license for persons convicted of a crime against challenger after he had served a ten-year sentence
for performing an abortion); see also Eastman v. State, 10 N.E. 97 (Ind. 1887) (affirming that the
state may require good moral character for licensing); Thompson v. Hazen, 25 Me. 104 (1845);
State ex rel. Powell v. State Med. Examining Bd., 20 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1884) (same); State v.
Hathaway, 21 S.W. 1081 (Mo. 1893) (same); State v. Call, 28 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1897) (same).
95. Rhode, supra note 92, at 493.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Broman, supra note 23, at 842 (“In a situation where physicians were not
manifestly more ‘expert’ as practitioners, their rhetoric tended to emphasize social distinctiveness
in other ways.”). Accordingly, the advice given to young physicians reflected this distinctiveness
claim in the following way:
Even at the very end of the century, physicians routinely depicted themselves as
members of a gentlemanly caste distinguished by its learning and dignified reserve.
One well-received guide for aspiring physicians, written by the Tübingen medical
professor Wilhelm Gottfried Ploucquet (1744–1814), emphasized the good moral
character and bearing required of a physician. To develop these traits, Ploucquet
suggested that young men intended for the medical profession be given training in
dancing (which would teach them to move gracefully), music, drawing, and painting.
For those who had finished their education and entered upon professional life,
Ploucquet sternly enjoined them from being seen in public drinking houses or playing
games of chance. In outfitting their offices, he advised young doctors to display their
testimonials and degrees prominently and to assemble an impressive library, the
contents of which should presumably be read, although Ploucquet did not elaborate on
that point. They should also guard against changing churches without good cause, as
well as creating any suspicion of either irreligiosity or zealotry. Finally, Ploucquet
recommended that the young doctor dress well but not too elegantly, that he cultivate
a pleasant and witty manner, and that he not contradict his superiors, except of course
in medical matters.
Id. at 844.
98. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 92, at 529–46 (discussing subjectivity of standards and
idiosyncrasies of implementation); id. at 559–63 (discussing problems with predictions based on
prior conduct); see also, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Folly of Expecting Evil: Reconsidering the Bar’s
Character and Fitness Requirement, 2014 BYU L. REV. 775, 777 (2014) (discussing the many
shortcomings of the character and fitness inquiry); Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other
Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2622 (2014) [hereinafter Levin,
Monopoly Myth] (“[T]he information elicited during that process (e.g., prior convictions, substance
abuse) does not strongly predict who will later be disciplined.”).
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In the absence of meaningful standards or professional consensus, the filtering process
has proved inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and needlessly intrusive. We have developed
neither a coherent concept of professional character nor effective procedures to predict it.
Rather, we have maintained a licensing ritual that too often has debased the ideals it
seeks to sustain.99

On the one hand, few applicants are actually denied admission.100
Historically, as Rhode points out, “[t]he only substantial group
effectively excluded on grounds of character seems to have been
women.”101 On the other hand, “the number deterred, delayed or
harassed has been more substantial.”102
But the individual professional can be tied to the ethics of the
profession without an individualized character test as a precondition
for entry. Subsequent enforcement of ethics codes by disciplinary bodies
more plausibly accomplishes this goal. Implementation of subsequent
enforcement, however, is not without potential pitfalls. In the
healthcare context, Nadia Sawicki has argued that state medical
licensing boards ought to prioritize disciplinary action taken on the
basis of competence rather than character.103 Medical boards “often
focus on character-related misconduct, including criminal misconduct,
that bears only a tangential relation to clinical quality and patient
care.”104 Citing disciplinary actions for behaviors “as varied as tax
fraud, failure to facilitate review of child support obligations, soliciting
sex in a public restroom, possession of marijuana for personal use, and
reckless driving involving alcohol,” Sawicki “questions whether, in light
of the traditional goals of professional discipline, sanctioning physicians
on these grounds (as opposed to grounds more clearly linked to clinical
practice) is the most effective or efficient use of medical boards’
resources.”105
Rhode reaches the same conclusion with respect to the legal
profession. Abandoning the character inquiry as a prerequisite for
admissions and ending the policing of nonprofessional behavior would
99. Rhode, supra note 92, at 494.
100. Id. at 493–94. For a prominent example, see In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83 (1961). See
also Crimesider Staff, From Jail to Yale: Man Faces Scrutiny in Bid to Be Lawyer, CBS NEWS (Aug.
8, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/from-jail-to-yale-man-faces-scrutiny-in-bid-tobecome-lawyer/ [http://perma.cc/349D-ZXVR] (“A convicted felon who graduated from Yale Law
School and won acclaim as a poet is being asked by a Connecticut committee to prove his ‘good
moral character’ before he is allowed to practice law.”); Bari Weiss, Opinion, Admit This Ex-Con
to the Connecticut Bar, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vkjlTF [https://perma.cc/DRY83RPN] (“Dwayne Betts is the kind of man who should be receiving awards from the bar association
of Connecticut. Instead, he hasn’t been admitted.”).
101. Rhode, supra note 92, at 497.
102. Id. at 494.
103. Sawicki, supra note 76.
104. Id. at 287.
105. Id. at 288.
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allow a new focus on professional abuses.106 She notes that “if the
profession’s regulatory process is to assume meaningful symbolic
dimensions, its force should be conserved for acts bearing directly on
professional practice.”107 Further, “[m]ost garden variety professional
misconduct—incompetence, harassment, deception, and delay—is
rarely reported or sanctioned. Until those priorities are reversed, the
bar can lay no special claim to character as a professional credential.”108
Understanding the professions as knowledge communities adds force to
this argument.109 A knowledge-centered approach highlights the ill fit
between character requirements upon entry and nonprofessional
discipline, while also emphasizing the need for more oversight of
professional behavior and, in particular, an emphasis on ensuring
competence.
Ultimately, absent empirical support for the claim that the
character and fitness inquiry actually ensures professionals’ superior
moral character for the benefit of clients, ascertaining the character and
fitness of professionals as a prerequisite for entry into the profession is
a weak justification for professional licensing. It seems particularly
outdated to the modern view of professionalism, which, at its core,
means professional competence. Whereas ex post enforcement of
professional responsibility and ethics rules on professional activities by
way of disciplinary action can plausibly ensure that the licensed
member of the profession acts in accordance with the profession’s rules,

106. Rhode, supra note 92, at 585; id. at 589 (“[A]bandoning the enterprise has much to
commend it. In essence, the bar would cease monitoring character for purposes of admitting
attorneys or of disciplining non-professional abuses. Such an approach would avoid the
indeterminacies of standards, the rigidity of rules, and the pretense that either promises adequate
public protection.”).
107. Id. at 591.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 509:
[T]he bar’s own interest in maintaining a professional community and public image. In
both its instrumental and symbolic dimensions, the certification process provides an
opportunity for affirming shared values. As sociologists since Durkheim have argued,
the concept of a profession presupposes some sense of common identity. Excluding
certain candidates on character grounds serves to designate deviance, thus establishing
the boundaries of a moral community.
Whereas Rhode’s focus is on the profession as a moral community, I emphasize the profession’s
shared knowledge. This approach likewise demands the exclusion of outliers, but not on moral
grounds. Exclusion of outliers under the knowledge community approach excludes those who do
not base their professional advice on a shared methodology and justify their professional advice in
terms of shared ways of knowing and reasoning of the profession. See Claudia E. Haupt, Religious
Outliers: Professional Knowledge Communities, Individual Conscience Claims, and the
Availability of Professional Services to the Public, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATES 173 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017); Haupt, supra note 10, at 690–705
(discussing justifications for outlier status).
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ex ante assessments of the applicant’s moral character and fitness do
not provide a useful justification for professional licensing.
3. Competence
Perhaps most importantly, licensing requirements are intended
to ensure professionals’ competence. Competence is at the core of the
harm-avoidance principle that underlies traditional justifications of
licensing. Only a competent professional will give good advice, and
licensing should help ensure that unqualified providers do not harm
clients and patients by giving bad advice. With respect to the legal
profession, Wendel thus has “no doubt that regulation can be justified
as a means of ensuring the quality of some product or service,” including
the provision of legal services.110 Graduating from law school and
passing the bar exam can be required as a matter of professional
regulation because these benchmarks signal to prospective clients the
requisite competence of the person providing legal services.111 But other
scholars cite empirical evidence suggesting “that experienced
nonlawyers can provide competent legal services in certain contexts and
in some cases, can seemingly do so as effectively as lawyers.”112 Stated
another way, just being licensed does not guarantee expertise; it may
be necessary, but not sufficient for rendering competent advice.113
However, the professional-practice context matters. Lawyer
representation in civil proceedings, for example, is deemed superior to
nonlawyer representation in the same arena.114 Another way to put the
question is whether “formal legal training” matters and when outcomes
are most likely to be affected.115 Studying a variety of settings, including
unemployment compensation appeals, social security disability
appeals, state labor grievance arbitration, and tax appeals, one
prominent scholar “concluded that the ‘presence or absence of formal
legal training is less important than substantial experience with the
110. Wendel, supra note 90, at 2579.
111. Id. But see Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2683 (“[R]estricting the practice of law to those who
have completed a juris doctor has constrained the market options so that many consumers have
no access to legal services at all.”).
112. Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2614.
113. See Wendel, supra note 90, at 2580–81 (suggesting that “it may be the case that
professional expertise is highly differentiated. Merely being admitted to practice law does not
guarantee one’s competence at any particular task, let alone one’s comparative advantage over
nonlawyer professionals at performing that task”).
114. Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2617–18 (further noting that “the procedural
complexity of the matters may affect the degree of differences in outcomes when individuals are
represented by lawyers and when they are not”).
115. Id. at 2619–20 (citing HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND
NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998)).

Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/31/2019 1:27 AM

LICENSING KNOWLEDGE

523

setting.’ Three types of expertise were important: knowledge about the
substantive law, an understanding of the procedures, and familiarity
with the regular players in the process.”116
None of this cuts against professional licensing in general.
Rather, these insights suggest alternative licensing regimes. They do
not, however, support the notion that clients are better off being
represented by unlicensed providers. In fact, citing the example of
unlicensed “notarios,” Leslie Levin notes that their lack of training in
the complex area of immigration law and their inadequate advice “can
have devastating consequences.”117 Moreover, certain particularly
complex matters are best handled by experienced individuals.118
Likewise, the case for restricting legal practice to trained and licensed
attorneys is strongest in the litigation setting.119 In other words,
expertise is important, and licensing—subject to appropriate
calibrating—is a useful mechanism in principle to achieve the
important goal of protecting the public by way of ensuring quality in
professional services.
The upshot of this line of criticism primarily concerns tailoring.
One solution might involve licensed nonlawyer providers.120 But that is
very different from opposition to licensing, as these scholars readily
point out.121 Similarly, Levin notes that “the public would be better
served if more nonlawyer representatives—who were subject to
educational and licensing requirements—could provide more legal
services to the public.”122 The critics of unauthorized practice laws thus
do not, in fact, challenge in any fundamental way the wisdom of

116. Id. at 2620.
117. Id. at 2616.
118. Id. at 2629 (“No one seriously questions that an experienced securities litigator is more
competent to handle a federal securities lawsuit than an untrained lay representative.”).
119. Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2699. However, Rigertas notes that “[t]he relative strength of
the justification does not necessarily mean that only lawyers should perform those services.” Id.
120. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 37, at 2607.
121. Id. (“[O]pening the practice to ‘unschooled unregulated nonlawyers’ is not the only
alternative to lawyers’ monopoly over routine assistance. We advocate access to qualified licensed
providers.”). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 96 (1981)
(expressing preference for “voluntary certification or mandatory registration”). Rhode further
notes that “as a policy matter, full-scale licensing structures are desirable only when harms are
‘demonstrated or easily recognizable.’ As a constitutional matter, however, such restraints are still
a less restrictive and hence preferable alternative to unqualified prohibitions on lay practice.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
122. Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2615; see also Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2689
(suggesting that “regulating the delivery of legal services does not necessarily mean that only
lawyers can deliver legal services” because “[d]ifferent types of practitioners could be regulated
too”).
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licensing. Rather, they advocate a different way of tailoring licensing
regimes and the services provided by other licensed professionals.
Such ideas of diversifying and recalibrating professional
licensing are proliferating in various forms and across various
professions. One example is the licensing of Limited License Legal
Technicians (“LLLTs”) in the state of Washington, the first state to
introduce this legal service provider model.123 In 2019, Utah will become
the second state to do so.124 Importantly, licensing is still tied to
competence. As compared to legal service providers, the healthcare
professions display a wider variety of licensed professions performing
some tasks previously allocated primarily to physicians.125 The
emergence of physician assistants in the twentieth century serves as an
example of this phenomenon.126
In the end, the critics make a forceful argument for recalibrating
existing regimes to better match licensing to competence and access.
But they do not argue that weeding out bad providers ought to be left
solely to ex post regulation by the tort regime, nor do they argue that
professional licensing should be abandoned entirely.
C. The New First Amendment Critique
First Amendment attacks on professional licensing are newly
popular.127 Indeed, “plaintiffs across the country are increasingly
invoking the Free Speech Clause as a shield against what a generation
ago would have been viewed as ordinary economic regulation subject to
123. Become A Legal Technician, WASH. ST. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.wsba.org/
licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limited-licenses/legal-technicians [https://perma.cc/7K8U-S53M];
see also Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2630–31 (explaining the scope of LLLTs’
professional activities and education and other licensing requirements); Rigertas, supra note 71,
at 2699 (“Three states—Washington, California, and New York—are all currently examining the
role that nonlawyers can play in the delivery of legal services. This suggests some growing
recognition that a licensed attorney may not be needed for every legal issue.”). Other examples
include certified legal document preparers in Arizona and legal document assistants in California.
See Levin, Monopoly Myth, supra note 98, at 2615.
124. Debra Cassens Weiss, First Paralegal Practitioners in Utah are Expected to be Licensed
in 2019, ABA J. (Aug 7, 2018, 9:04 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/first_
paralegal_practitioners_in_utah_are_expected_to_be_licensed_in_2019 [https://perma.cc/X5E3J3EJ].
125. Cf. Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2699 (“Much like the delivery of healthcare services, there
are potential benefits in stratifying the legal profession to train and regulate professionals with
different types of legal training.”(footnote omitted)).
126. See, e.g., Reginald Carter, Physician Assistant History, 12 PERSPECTIVE ON PHYSICIAN
ASSISTANT EDUC. 130 (2001) (providing a brief overview of the profession).
127. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Many of these current and recent cases are
litigated by the Institute for Justice, which makes a list of them available on its website. See Cases,
INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/cases (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RP2Y-U4BM]
(listing economic liberty and First Amendment cases).
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lax, if any, constitutional review.”128 One lawyer explains that “several
trends in constitutional scholarship and doctrine suggest that a
transformation of [occupational freedom] jurisprudence may be closer
at hand than many would suppose.”129 One of the indicators of change
he cites is “[a] growing number of cases where the fundamental right to
free speech meets the nonfundamental right to occupational
freedom.”130 The explicit goal is to unsettle the rational basis framework
commonly applied to professional regulation131 and substitute the
doctrinal framework of the First Amendment.132 Framing licensing
challenges as First Amendment claims, in other words, is an attempt to
heighten the level of scrutiny that would otherwise apply to economic
regulation.
First Amendment challenges to licensing can take several forms.
One approach contends that professional licensing imposes a prior
restraint on speech. The Ninth Circuit in National Ass’n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis held “that the psychology licensing
laws are not a prior restraint on speech.”133 The court explained in two
short sentences: “Because this is a valid licensing scheme designed to
protect the mental health of Californians, the state ‘may exercise some
discretion in granting licenses.’ Because there is no allegation that the
state is revoking or denying licenses ‘for arbitrary or constitutionally
suspect reasons,’ there is no problem of prior restraint.”134
Conversely, Robert Kry has argued that professional licensing
does, in fact, raise First Amendment concerns precisely “because the
license requirement arguably acts as a prior restraint on speech.”135
Professional licensing regimes, he suggests, are especially troublesome
as a form of prior restraint because they “impose significant burdens on
the speaker” and “grant administrative officials broad discretion in
evaluating applications.”136 I will later return to the question of prior
restraint.137 To preview my conclusion, professional licensing is indeed
a prior restraint on a professional’s speech, but in the professional
128. Shanor, supra note 11, at 316.
129. Neily, supra note 1, at 305.
130. Id.
131. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“[I]t is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.”).
132. Neily, supra note 1, at 311 (“Applying the various forms of heightened scrutiny typically
associated with free speech claims to cases involving occupational speech creates interesting and
potentially fruitful doctrinal tensions.”).
133. 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000).
134. Id. (citation omitted).
135. Kry, supra note 7, at 889.
136. Id. at 890.
137. See infra Section IV.A.2.
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context, it is permissible for the reasons set forth in the intervening
analysis.138
The tour guide cases—challenging various cities’ requirements
that tour guides be licensed—provide examples of additional First
Amendment claims.139 Plaintiffs relied on the First Amendment to
argue that the licensing schemes were impermissible content-based
regulations of speech.140 In addition, they argued that even if the
regulations were content neutral, there was no evidence of harm that
supported creating licensing requirements for tour guides.141
The Fifth Circuit in the New Orleans tour guide case explained
that applicants for a license “must pass an examination testing
knowledge of the historical, cultural and sociological developments and
points of interest of the city, must not have been convicted of a felony
within the prior five years, pass a drug test, and pay a . . . fee.”142 The
court reasoned that the city had an interest in benefitting its visitors by
identifying
tour
guides
with
licenses
as
being
“reliable, . . . knowledgeable about the city and trustworthy, lawabiding and free of drug addiction.”143 The court held this to be a valid
exercise of police powers that did not target the content of speech.144
Thus, “New Orleans, by requiring the licensees to know the city and not
be felons or drug addicts, has effectively promoted the government
interests, and without those protections for the city and its visitors, the
government interest would be unserved.”145
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit found “the record wholly devoid of
evidence supporting the burdens the challenged regulations impose
on . . . speech.”146 Assuming that the regulations were content
neutral,147 the court nonetheless still held them to fail intermediate
scrutiny and pointed out “the substantial mismatch” between the
regulation and its goals.148 Requiring tour guides to take an exam, in
138. See infra Parts II & III.
139. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that
even if a D.C. tour guide licensing regime was content neutral, it failed intermediate scrutiny);
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that a tour guide licensing
law was content neutral); Billups v. City of Charleston, 194 F. Supp. 3d 452, 475 (D.S.C. 2016)
(involving a First Amendment challenge to the city’s tour guide licensing law).
140. Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1000.
141. Id.
142. Kagan, 753 F.3d at 561 (noting that the fee for the initial application is fifty dollars and
the renewal fee is twenty dollars “when renewing after two years”).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 561–62.
145. Id. at 562.
146. Edwards, 755 F.3d at 998.
147. Id. at 1001.
148. Id. at 1008.
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the court’s view, was not “an appropriately tailored antidote,” even if
the District’s goal was to prevent potential harms to visitors.149
Finally, in the Charleston tour guide case, the district court
initially denied a preliminary injunction against the licensing
regulations.150 The court followed a similar line of reasoning as the Fifth
Circuit in determining the regulation to be content neutral.151 Applying
intermediate scrutiny, the district court determined that the D.C.
Circuit’s approach “provide[d] a somewhat better illustration of the
analysis required.”152 Although in the district court’s view the demands
for showing evidence of harm were less stringent than the D.C. Circuit
articulated, it held that Charleston was required to provide some
evidence of harms that the licensing requirement prevents.153 After a
bench trial, the court decided that the licensing regime was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.154
The Charleston tour guide case was decided after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,155 a case involving a
municipal sign ordinance. Taken literally, the Reed decision imposed a
strict and sweeping requirement of content neutrality.156 Indeed, the
district court framed its First Amendment analysis in terms of Reed’s
requirement of content neutrality,157 initially rejecting158 but ultimately
leaving open its application in the Charleston case.159 By contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, a case
concerning a Florida statute that prohibited doctors from asking about
gun ownership as a matter of course, applied the content-neutrality
framework of Reed to professional speech regulation.160 Whether the
requirement of content neutrality applies in the area of professional
licensing or professional speech regulation is an unresolved question of

149. Id. at 1009.
150. Billups v. City of Charleston, 194 F. Supp. 3d 452, 467 (D.S.C. 2016).
151. Id. at 466–67.
152. Id. at 472.
153. Id. at 472–73.
154. Id. at 517–18.
155. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (2015).
156. See Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981,
1986 (2016).
157. Billups, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 461–65.
158. Id. at 464 (noting that the Reed Court “cannot have meant that every law restricting
conduct also imposes a content-based restriction on speech made in the course of such conduct”
because it “would effectively remove the distinction between speech and conduct, and require
almost every regulation to pass strict scrutiny under the First Amendment,” an “untenable”
result).
159. Id. at 511 (“The court does not need to determine whether the licensing law is contentbased . . . .”).
160. 848 F.3d 1293, 1302–03, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2017).
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First Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) v. Becerra
suggests that it does,161 while the dissent cautions against an overly
broad understanding of the doctrine of content neutrality.162 I have
argued elsewhere that content neutrality should be rejected in this
context.163
In addition to tour guides,164 First Amendment challenges target
licensing requirements for such diverse occupations as fortune tellers165
and interior decorators.166 Notably, these cases are frequently discussed
alongside cases involving professionals such as psychologists, doctors,
and lawyers.167 But doing so obscures an important point: not all
professional licensing schemes are the same. For one, “not all
occupations pose equivalent threats to health and safety.”168 Amanda
Shanor, in illustrating the critics’ argument, raises a useful example
that clarifies how the concept of the professions as knowledge
communities influences the analysis:
If I am your doctor, and I recommend we amputate your leg (when, based on prevailing
professional norms, we certainly should not), and you later sue me for malpractice, the
claim is no less based on words than a tour guide who “speaks” for a living. “But,” you
might say, “the malpractice example has a real-world harm—you cut off my leg!” Of
course, you would be right. But that harm does not have any analytically different
relationship to speech than the sorts of harms – health and safety, say – that licensing

161. See 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (“The dangers associated with content-based regulations
of speech are also present in the context of professional speech.”).
162. Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting):
Because much, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech and because
much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s
approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity
of much, perhaps most, government regulation.
163. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE
L.J. FORUM 150, 151 (2017) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s content-neutrality approach in
Wollschlaeger); see also infra Section IV.A.1.
164. See supra notes 139–153 and accompanying text.
165. See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 562–65 (4th Cir. 2013).
166. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011).
167. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (“As defined by the courts of appeals, the professionalspeech doctrine would cover a wide array of individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses, physical
therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, barbers, and many others.”); see also Neily, supra note 1, at
310 (citing cases involving psychologists: Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2014);
and King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 246 (3d Cir. 2014)); Shanor, supra note 11, at
315 (noting that previously, “[r]egulations requiring you to get a license before working as a doctor,
a lawyer, or a candlestick maker (not to mention a tour guide or a securities trader), were . . . part
of the vast swath of non-constitutionalized economic life”); Kleiner, supra note 26, at 12–14
(discussing healthcare professions alongside TV repair servicers, construction contractors, florists,
and teachers).
168. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 5.

Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/31/2019 1:27 AM

LICENSING KNOWLEDGE

529

seeks to address in the first instance. The harms that may flow from fraud or malpractice
are no less related to the “speakingness” of a “speaking occupation.”169

But understanding professional advice and its relationship to a
knowledge community leads to an analytical distinction between the
speech of a doctor—rightly subject to malpractice liability170—and the
speech of a tour guide. Under a professional speech theory based on an
understanding of the professions as knowledge communities, speech
that does not convey professional knowledge is not protected as
professional speech. The analytical shift I propose is from the speech
itself as the form of communication to the specific kind of speech—that
is, professional speech communicating the knowledge community’s
insights to the client within a professional-client relationship. If a
professional’s speech merely conveys information—the content of the
tour guide’s speech could just as well be gleaned from Google Maps or a
guidebook—it is not personalized advice that communicates the
knowledge community’s insights. And licensing is still permissible for
reasons unrelated to speech. Imagine a guided Segway tour; a licensing
requirement might ensure that the Segway does not cause injuries.
Professional speech is a distinctive type of speech that is more
than the conveyance of raw information. Its content is instead
individualized to the situation of the client,171 it is tied to a body of
disciplinary knowledge from which it gains authority, and it occurs
within a social relationship that is defined by knowledge asymmetry
between speaker and listener, reliance on the speaker’s advice, and
trust in the accuracy of that advice.172
The key to a conceptual solution for the First Amendmentversus-licensing puzzle lies in understanding the underlying normative
concerns. If we reconceptualize professionals as members of knowledge
communities, First Amendment interests in the professional context
reinforce—rather than undermine—the goals of licensing. The shared
interest is to ensure that competent advice flows from the knowledge
community through the conduit of the individual professional to the
client. To support this claim, Part II provides a thicker account of the
nature of, and interests involved in, professional advice-giving.

169. Shanor, supra note 11, at 321.
170. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1285–87 (discussing professional malpractice liability).
171. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result) (“One who
takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the
client in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging
in the practice of a profession.”).
172. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1250–54.
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D. Identifying the Object of Licensing
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the subjects of
licensing—ranging from tour guides, psychics, and interior decorators
to doctors, lawyers, therapists, and pharmacists. But a more useful
question concerns the object of licensing, and I suggest that shifting
focus to the object brings the central role of professional knowledge to
the fore. This different perspective also reflects a move in the sociology
of the professions literature away from the question of “what is a
profession?”173 The object of licensing across professions may be
different, accounting for conceptual slippage. In other words, knowledge
is not always the object of licensing in the professions discussed. One
key question is whether professional advice-giving or the delivery of a
service is the primary objective of the professional-client relationship.
Another question is whether information—as in the tour guide cases—
or professional knowledge is conveyed.
The most salient justification for professional licensing is
ensuring the professional’s competence; thus, the object of licensing is
the professional’s knowledge. Licensing so understood ties the
individual professional to the knowledge community by requiring a link
between the ability to speak as a professional and the communication
of knowledge as defined by the profession. This concept necessarily
excludes a number of occupations. Where a professional’s activity does
not consist of advice-giving, the link between advice and the knowledge
community does not exist. Of course, this conceptualization results in
line-drawing exercises that are difficult to exhaustively resolve in the
abstract. But the existence of a fiduciary relationship or of a regime of
professional malpractice liability can serve as a useful proxy.
As discussed in the tour guide examples, where information but
not professional knowledge is communicated, the value of the
professional’s speech is more like the delivery of a service. This accounts
for the difference in the speech of the psychic or the tour guide on the
one hand and the doctor or lawyer on the other hand.174 It also points
to the limits of licensing to protect professional advice. The framework
applies to professions where the object of licensing is the content of a
173. See infra Section II.B.
174. Cf. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375
(2018):
‘Professional speech’ is also a difficult category to define with precision. As defined by
the courts of appeals, the professional-speech doctrine would cover a wide array of
individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses, physical therapists, truck drivers, bartenders,
barbers, and many others. One court of appeals has even applied it to fortune tellers.
(citations omitted).
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professional knowledge community’s insights.175 This is not to collapse
the speech/conduct distinction but rather to distinguish professional
speech that communicates a knowledge community’s expertise.
An important consequence of shifting the focus to professional
knowledge is that the First Amendment critique of professional
licensing fails when the object of licensing is professional knowledge.
The values underlying First Amendment protection of professional
speech and ensuring the competence of professionals, the objective of
professional licensing, rather than being in conflict, are mutually
reinforcing. The remainder of this Article provides a defense of this
claim, and offers a new view of justifications for professional licensing
that builds on this understanding.
II. EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND PROFESSIONAL ADVICE
Fully appreciating the values underlying professional speech
and professional licensing requires a thicker account of what
professional knowledge is, how it is generated, and what its effects are.
This Part offers a descriptive-analytical account of the nature of expert
knowledge, its connection to professional advice-giving, and its societal
effects by drawing on the sociology of knowledge and science and
technology studies (“STS”) literature regarding the epistemological
foundations of expert knowledge. It then puts this body of literature
into conversation with scholarship on the sociology of the professions.
In so doing, it seeks to respond in part to Robert Post’s call for
developing a “constitutional sociology of knowledge.”176 This account
reveals the distinctive nature of professional advice-giving and its link
to the professional knowledge community’s body of knowledge. It also
explains why First Amendment doctrine should reflect the unique
nature of professional speech.
The following discussion first distinguishes information and
knowledge—a specific type of information communicated as
professional advice. It then connects expert-knowledge formation to the
dissemination of professional advice. Finally, through the lens of
democratic theory, it traces the flow of professional expert knowledge
from the knowledge community through the individual professional
within the professional-client relationship to the client and back into
public discourse.

175. Cf. id. at 2382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority’s constitutional
approach to content-based speech will obscure First Amendment goals).
176. POST, supra note 14, at 55.
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A. Distinguishing Information and Knowledge
The hook for First Amendment challenges to professional
licensing is that many professionals convey advice through language.177
As one commentator notes, “In the information age, an increasing
number of vocations involve nothing more than expressing ideas or
transmitting information, rather than creating a physical product.”178
Another critic of licensing asserts that while the Supreme Court has
loosened commercial speech restrictions in the interest of “the free flow
of information to the consumer,” it has yet “to fully realize the
importance of the free flow of information to the recipient of
professional advice.”179
But conflating information and knowledge rests on an
oversimplification. The listener’s perspective reveals the qualitative
difference between them. A client or patient today may have access to
virtually unlimited amounts of information through multiple channels.
Yet, none of this information amounts to expert knowledge. To be flip,
Dr. Google is not really your doctor.
Licensing regimes, like fiduciary duties, assume asymmetry
between actors: “The professional-client relationship is typically
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge. The client seeks the
professional’s advice precisely because of this asymmetry.”180 But some
question the accuracy of that assumption in an era of ever-increasing
access to information.181 Discussing various forms of policy responses to
information asymmetries, they contend that “[a]s information becomes
more prevalent and systematic, earlier solutions to asymmetric
problems will become less necessary.”182 Scholars of the legal profession
likewise assert that “[t]he internet has provided consumers with
increasing access to information about the law and to information about
the quality of services provided.”183 But do considerations underlying
information asymmetries184 translate to licensing healthcare providers?
Some critics of licensing say yes, noting that “[f]or decades, asymmetric
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text.
Neily, supra note 1, at 310.
Kry, supra note 7, at 976.
Haupt, supra note 4, at 1243.
See, e.g., Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, The End of Asymmetric Information, CATO
UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/06/alex-tabarrok-tyler-cowen/
end-asymmetric-information [https://perma.cc/VM5G-LUX9] (“A lot of economic theories about
asymmetric information, while logically correct, have been rendered empirically obsolete.”).
182. Id.
183. Rigertas, supra note 71, at 2691.
184. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (examining how information asymmetry affects markets).
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information—the inability of consumers to judge medical
professionals—has been the go-to defense for state-level licensing
activities.”185 Largely reciting the economic critiques of professional
licensing,186 these critics argue that “the asymmetric information
argument has been used far too often to protect rents, including the
protection of physicians and dentists from greater competition from
nurse practitioners and dental hygienists.”187 As already noted in the
discussion of economic objections to licensing, these arguments
primarily cut in favor of recalibrating, rather than abolishing, existing
licensing regimes.
The larger question concerns the nature and formation of expert
knowledge. Is expert knowledge still relevant in the information age?
This requires a closer look at who is an expert to begin with, a
foundational question in the sociology of knowledge literature. Who
counts as an expert, and how far does the group of experts, however
defined, extend into the public? Medical sociology, for instance, has
observed a trend toward democratization as a result of a wider
“challenge on the expertise of professionals.”188 Discussions
surrounding the term “lay expert” reflect the underlying concerns.
Some scholars suggest that the lay public can, in fact, acquire relevant
knowledge through various channels, including “having experiential
knowledge of a condition” or otherwise acquiring knowledge “on a par
with those who have scientific training.”189 Others, however, discard
this term as an oxymoron, instead suggesting that the real question
concerns the “extension” of whose knowledge counts as expertise, not
how individuals acquired their expertise.190 Nonetheless, even those
185. Shirley V. Svorny, Asymmetric Information and Medical Licensure, CATO UNBOUND (Apr.
10, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/10/shirley-v-svorny/asymmetric-informationmedical-licensure [https://perma.cc/7MSW-LU4T].
186. See supra Section I.B.2.
187. Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, Symmetric Information Won’t Be Perfect, CATO UNBOUND
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/20/alex-tabarrok-tyler-cowen/symmetricinformation-wont-be-perfect [https://perma.cc/Z63E-8RAJ].
188. Lindsay Prior, Belief, Knowledge and Expertise: The Emergence of the Lay Expert in
Medical Sociology, 25 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 41, 43 (2003).
189. Id. at 45 (citing literature on AIDS); see also H.M. Collins & Robert Evans, The Third
Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, 32 SOC. STUD. SCI. 235, 262 (2002)
(“The AIDS-treatment controversy in the San Francisco gay community is an example where the
non-certified experts succeeded in gaining an entrée to the scientific core. But they did not manage
this until they gained interactional expertise – that is, until after they learned the language of the
relevant science.” (footnote omitted)). The foundational sociological study is STEVEN EPSTEIN,
IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996).
190. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 238:
We say that those referred to by some other analysts as ‘lay experts’ are just plain
‘experts’ – albeit their expertise has not been recognized by certification; crucially, they
are not spread throughout the population, but are found in small specialist groups.
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employing the term note that “for the most part, lay people are not
experts. They are, for example, rarely skilled in matters of (medical)
fact gathering, or in the business of diagnosis. What is more they can
often be plain wrong about the causes, course and management of
common forms of disease and illness.”191
Returning to the relationship between increased access to
information and expert knowledge, consider the example of access to
health information. Various web-based, health-related platforms
provide plenty of information—but self-diagnoses are still tricky
business due to the problems associated with reliability of information
and its interpretation.192 In the end, the simple but important insight
is this: information and knowledge are qualitatively different. The next
Section further investigates what accounts for that difference.
B. Expert Knowledge in Professional Advice-Giving
This Section explores two interrelated questions: First, how is
expert knowledge formed within knowledge communities—this process
of knowledge formation qualitatively distinguishes knowledge from
information—and second, how is expert knowledge disseminated by
professionals as professional advice?
The “modern idea of scientific expertise is compounded from two
historically distinct elements: occupational expertise and the expertise
claimed by scientists as privileged knowers of truths about the
world.”193 Historians trace the distinction between theoretical
knowledge and practical uses “as far back as Plato and Aristotle,”
pinpointing the Enlightenment as the moment “the connection between
theory and practice receive its modern formulation when, in addition to
designating a set of truths about nature, theory also became a social
good, a bedrock of knowledge on which enlightened society could
engineer its own progress.”194 To that end, Post posits that “[a]ny
Instead of using the oxymoron, we will refer to members of the public who have special
technical expertise in virtue of experience that is not recognized by degrees or other
certificates as ‘experience-based experts.’
191. Prior, supra note 188, at 45.
192. See, e.g., Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]nformation obtained
from chat rooms and tabloids cannot make up for the loss of individualized advice from a physician
with many years of training and experience.”); see also Tyler Falk, This App Gives Free Medical
Advice from Real Doctors, ZDNET (Apr. 11, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/this-appgives-free-medical-advice-from-real-doctors [https://perma.cc/8X8P-PKVQ] (“But from message
boards to websites like WebMD, all of that information can be overwhelming and confusing,
leaving you wondering if you have the common cold or cancer and unsure which advice to trust.”).
193. Thomas Broman, The Semblance of Transparency: Expertise as a Social Good and an
Ideology in Enlightened Societies, 27 OSIRIS 188, 188 (2012).
194. Id. at 192.
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modern society needs expert knowledge in order to survive and
prosper.”195
Different experts contribute to this project, with varying
implications depending on their identities. While some worry about
opaque bureaucracies filled with obscure policymaking experts, others
study “professionals whom we deal with often in a face-to-face way.”196
From the vantage point of expertise and democracy, these two are
different in the way audiences perceive them as legitimate; therefore,
they should be distinguished.197 My attention throughout this
discussion is on the latter. The democracy problem of expert knowledge
seems to be primarily one of political accountability rather than
epistemic skepticism.198 Who determines the empirical foundations
guiding public policy is a more complex question in a democracy than
who gives advice, within a professional-client relationship, to solve an
individual’s problem. The two are related but not the same, though they
may make use of the same body of expert knowledge.
It is worth noting that sociologists and others studying the
processes of expert-knowledge formation themselves are engaged in a
contested endeavor. STS scholarship arguably “has effectively
deconstructed scientists’ claims that their research produces objective
knowledge.”199 How far this epistemic relativism extends, in turn, is
debated within that field. On the one hand, there has been a shift over
time from epistemological questions to social questions. On the other
hand, while finding the “sociological turn” in the literature helpful,
some suggest that going back to the epistemological questions is also
useful if the focus on “truth” is replaced with a focus on “expertise and
experience.”200 Sociologists have identified three waves of scholarship,
195. POST, supra note 14, at ix.
196. Stephen Turner, What is the Problem with Experts?, 31 SOC. STUD. SCI. 123, 128 (2001)
(“Whether this difference is significant is a question that I will leave open for the moment. But it
points to some difficulties with the concept of expertise itself that need to be more fully explored.”).
197. Id. at 131:
Thinking about the audiences of the expert – the audiences for whom the expert is
legitimate and whose acceptance legitimates her claims to expertise – illuminates a
puzzle in the discourse of the problem of expertise and democracy. Merton and
Habermas, it appeared, were not talking about the same kind of experts. For Merton,
the paradigm case was the physician, whose expert advice, say, to cut down on high-fat
foods, we receive with ambivalence.
198. Cf. id. at 140 (suggesting that “the difficulties that have concerned theorists of democracy
about the role of expert knowledge must be understood as arising not from the character of expert
knowledge itself (and its supposed inaccessibility to the masses), but from the sectarian character
of the kinds of expert knowledge that bear on bureaucratic decision-making”).
199. Broman, supra note 193, at 189.
200. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 236:
One of the most important contributions of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)
has been to make it much harder to make the claim: ‘Trust scientists because they have
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the first having ended201 and the second and third ongoing and
interacting.202 The focus of second wave scholarship is the
deconstruction of knowledge, and the third wave’s response is a
normative reconstruction of expertise.203
Moreover, the contingency and dynamism of scientific
knowledge is a complicating factor.204 For one, “around every core of
‘expert’ knowledge is a penumbra, a domain in which core competence
is helpful but not definitive, in which competent experts may disagree,
and disagree because the questions in this domain cannot be decided in
terms of the core issues that define competence.”205 I have elsewhere
addressed related First Amendment problems that follow when we
acknowledge that professional knowledge communities are not
monolithic and there may be a range of professional insights that count
as good advice.206 In addition, there is a temporal dimension. The
knowledge community may have embraced new insights long before
they are perceived as legitimate by the public. Or “the community may
come to conclude that only a fragment of what was formerly held to be
true was in fact true.”207 Here, too, I have previously addressed the First
Amendment issues concerning tested and refuted as well as emergent
and untested knowledge.208
The next step, then, is to trace how expert knowledge is
disseminated via professional advice. Sociologists have long explored
what differentiates the professions. This endeavor has seen several
iterations in which scholars refocused this question.209 Émile
Durkheim’s initial quest was to examine the role of the professions in

special access to the truth’. Our question is: ‘If it is no longer clear that scientists and
technologists have special access to the truth, why should their advice be specially
valued?’
201. Id. at 239. They pinpoint the end of this wave to the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its fallout. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
202. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 240.
203. Id. at 249–51.
204. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 196, at 141 (“To be sure many things may pass, in the eye of
the public, for science. Scientific views, and scientific consensuses, may of course change, and the
public may well legitimate and accept scientific communities whose views later appear to be
wrong.”).
205. Id. at 133.
206. See generally Haupt, supra note 10.
207. STEPHEN P. TURNER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 36 (2014).
208. Haupt, supra note 10, at 714–28.
209. For an overview, see Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism 16–24 (UNC Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2676094,
2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676094
[https://perma.cc/P4KF-VNZF] (tracing the role of professionals in knowledge dissemination).
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society.210 Subsequent generations of scholars building on Durkheim’s
scholarship took a functionalist view and attempted to isolate the
elements that are constitutive of the professions.211 Their core finding
that self-regulation is necessary to develop and disseminate valuable
professional expertise has been characterized as “portray[ing] the
professions in an overwhelmingly positive light.”212 Andrew Abbott’s
seminal work, The System of Professions,213 in turn, is part of the shift
from the question of what occupation is a “profession” to how a
professional group gains a professional monopoly and social status.214
Though much of the later literature focused on the shortcomings of the
professions and problems associated with monopoly status and
professional self-regulation,215 the allocation of professional competence
remains descriptively intact.
One distinction between the professions and other occupations
used by sociologists216 is the professions’ fusion of theory and practice.217
Beyond specialized education, “professions claim their education
presents a coherent body of theoretical doctrine that they apply in their
work.”218 This conceptualization provides a link between the knowledge
community’s insights and professional advice. The individual
professional can be seen as the conduit between the knowledge
community and the client.219
Underlying this claim to authority is the presence of a shared
methodology. In medicine and other professions, the scientific method
is considered a guarantor for the validity of that profession’s knowledge
basis.220 Interestingly, some scholars single out law as an exception:
210. See generally ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson
trans., The Macmillan Company 4th ed. 1960).
211. Remus, supra note 209, at 21 (citing Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal
Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1964); and William J. Goode, Community Within
a Community: The Professions, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 194, 195–96 (1957)).
212. Id. at 21.
213. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT
LABOR (1988).
214. Remus, supra note 209, at 22.
215. See id. at 22–23.
216. See Broman, supra note 23, at 835:
[S]ociologists have distinguished professions from other occupational groups by a nowfamiliar set of criteria, which usually include (1) specialized and advanced education,
(2) a code of conduct or ethics, (3) competency tests leading to licensing, (4) high social
prestige in comparison to manual labor, (5) monopolization of the market in services,
and (6) considerable autonomy in conduct of professional affairs.
217. Id. at 836.
218. Id.
219. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1254.
220. Broman, supra note 23, at 836 n.3 (“In many cases, the validity of a profession’s
theoretical knowledge is supposedly guaranteed by presenting it as the product of rigorous
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“Lawyers also claim to base their practice on theory, but legal theory is
not commonly regarded as ‘scientific.’ ”221 Moreover, “university law
schools are not uniquely privileged in the formation of legal theory.
Courts and legislatures also play a central role in this process.”222
However, the distinction may place too much emphasis on the
“scientific” aspect. As I have noted elsewhere, knowledge communities
have shared ways of knowing and reasoning, so the methodology claim
works without a claim to scientific methodology. In the context of the
legal profession, I have suggested that legal doctrine serves a
methodological function.223
The link between expertise and authority extends to the
professions in that “professional experts monopolize the ability to speak
the truth, and indeed to define which statements can be examined as
true or false. Needless to say, this gives experts tremendous authority
in modern society.” 224 Yet, scholars also suggest that “there has been
insufficient attention to the fact that the link between theory and
practice has to be forged in discourse as a condition for the existence of
the modern professions.”225 The basis for justifying professional
authority “derives uniquely from a set of claims that scientific theory
can and does guide practice and the institutional and educational
structures developed in accordance with those claims.”226 “Scientific” in
this sense denotes “presenting its theoretical apparatus as scientific—
that is, as empirical, objective, disinterested, methodologically rigorous,
and so forth.”227
Notwithstanding the normative criticism of the professions’
economic monopoly, descriptively, the knowledge asymmetry holds
true. Decoupling the economic monopoly from the expertise asymmetry

scientific method. This is most obviously the case with medicine, which boasts an enormous
research establishment, but is also true of clinical psychology, engineering, economics, and a host
of others.”).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 837 n.7.
223. See Claudia E. Haupt, Antidiscrimination in the Legal Profession and the First
Amendment: A Partial Defense of Model Rule 8.4(g), 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 14–17 (2017)
(discussing doctrine as methodology); see also Symposium, Developing Best Practices for Legal
Analysis, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2017).
224. Broman, supra note 23, at 837 (emphasis omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. This is also where professional knowledge formation connects to knowledge production
within the university. Id. at 837 n.7 (arguing “that university research departments constitute the
core regions of professional discourse”). As I have noted elsewhere, “While outside of the
professional-client relationship . . . the speech interests of professionals speaking to each other are
similar to those underlying academic speech.” Haupt, supra note 4, at 1252 n.51.
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in turn leads to a new view of licensing. Licensing, then, might be
understood as a form of “public recognition of expertise.”228
C. The Democratic Dimension of Professional Advice
Licensing creates speaker inequality. Determining whether this
seemingly undemocratic regulatory mechanism is compatible with
democratic values demands a better understanding of the role of
professionals, and more generally the role of expert knowledge they
disseminate, in a democratic society. Issues surrounding the connection
between democracy and professional expert knowledge are enduring
and remain underexplored. Frederick Schauer contends that
“[s]urprisingly little has been written about just what it is for a society
(or any other collection of individuals) to know something, as opposed
to what it is for an individual to know something.”229 As one political
theorist puts it, “The role of those with specialized knowledge in modern
democracy has been an unresolved issue since public intellectuals
began to confront it in the Progressive Era.”230 And further, “[t]he
professions have been neglected in political theory with negative
consequences for the field in general and for the development of
democratic theory in particular.”231 The following discussion explores
what it means to add professional knowledge as a source of knowing in
society. This discussion builds on Post’s exploration of democracy and
expertise,232 with a specific focus on the professions.
We assume equality in public discourse, and since public
discourse tends to be the default when we think about free speech more
generally, there is a strong democratic notion underlying the First
Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is firmly committed to
speaker equality in public discourse where one person’s opinion counts
the same as another person’s facts. Many have bemoaned the ensuing
spread of “fake news,” “junk science,” outright lies, and other distortions
of the “truth.”233 Facts in contemporary public discourse are under

228. Cf. Turner, supra note 196, at 138.
229. Schauer, supra note 19, at 902 n.25.
230. ALBERT W. DZUR, DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IDENTITY, AND PRACTICE 4 (2008). For historical
perspectives, see, for example, Eric H. Ash, Expertise and the Early Modern State, 25 OSIRIS 1
(2010); and Broman, supra note 193, at 195–99.
231. DZUR, supra note 230, at 6.
232. See generally POST, supra note 14.
233. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 19.
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siege; the Holmesian marketplace,234 it seems, has ceded to “posttruth.”235 Nonetheless, this traditionally strong notion of equality
continues to pervade our understanding of the First Amendment. The
justification is based in democratic theory: a fundamental belief in
equality of speakers and opinions in public discourse is necessary for
equal participation, which in turn forms the basis of democracy.236
But this assumption of speaker equality does not apply outside
of public discourse where we continue to value facts and truth. One such
area is professional speech. Most likely, patients and clients would want
to talk to a “real” professional, trained and licensed to practice
according to the standards of the profession, to obtain reliable advice.
Professional advice-giving in the strict sense—communicating
the insights of the knowledge community, within the professional-client
relationship, for the purpose of giving professional advice—is decidedly
not part of democratic public discourse.237 Professional insights are not
up for debate in the marketplace;238 unlike in the marketplace, there is
such a thing as disciplinary truth.239 And this disciplinary truth is
enforced by the professional malpractice regime, where failure to meet
the profession’s standard of care is sanctioned.240 Tied back to licensing,
this distinction between professional speech and speech in public
discourse explains Eugene Volokh’s assertion that “licensing
requirements for professionals who give personalized advice should

234. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting that
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market”).
235. See, e.g., Amy B. Wang, “Post-truth” Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries,
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/posttruth-named-2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries [https://perma.cc/WM6Y-83DA].
236. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 26 (“[T]he reason for this equality of status in
the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundation of the self-governing process. When men govern
themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness
and danger.”).
237. Cf. POST, supra note 14, at xii (“Because the practices that produce expert knowledge
regulate the autonomy of individual speakers to communicate, because they transpire in venues
quite distant from the sites where democratic public opinion is forged, they seem estranged from
most contemporary theories of the First Amendment.”).
238. Compare Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2374–75 (2018) (“[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail to
‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’ ” (quoting
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014)), with id. at 2382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“[I]n suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation, the
majority pays those First Amendment goals a serious disservice through dilution.”).
239. POST, supra note 14, at 45.
240. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1286 (describing malpractice standards in the medical and
legal contexts).
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probably be constitutionally permissible; a licensing requirement for
writing self-help books should be unconstitutional.”241
Nonetheless, an emerging body of literature—much of it focused
on the legal profession—discusses the potential benefits of a more
democratic approach to professional education and the provision of
professional services.242 Connecting the cost of professional services to
access restrictions, some find professional monopolies increasingly
difficult to justify.243 These considerations at first blush perhaps
suggest that a new, more democratic and egalitarian approach might
be desirable, and deregulation of professional licensing in the service of
democratization might initially sound appealing to some. But “[w]hile
many might laud the democratization of knowledge and the ideal of free
and equal competition of ideas in the proverbial marketplace, there are
certain lines that cannot be crossed if the sun is to continue to rise in
the east.”244 In other words, “egalitarian principles cannot be allowed to
run amok when it comes to how we understand truth or, if you will,
expert knowledge.”245
To capture these parameters, the absence of speaker equality
when it comes to expert knowledge might be described as
“undemocratic.”246 When professional knowledge is sought, “there has
to be some rupture, at some point, of egalitarian norms.”247 That does
not mean that expert knowledge has no role in democratic public
discourse. In fact, it informs public discourse in a manner that can lead
to more informed decisions of citizens without expert knowledge by
providing expertise where it otherwise would not exist. Thus, precisely
by virtue of its undemocratic nature, it has the potential to advance
democratic public discourse. On this view, the presence of expert
knowledge is better for public discourse than its absence.248

241. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1343 (2005) (footnote omitted).
242. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1 (2012); Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281
(2013).
243. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
244. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern State:
Post’s Republic and the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 369, 369 (2012).
245. Id.
246. See id. at 375.
247. Id. at 370.
248. As Schauer has noted, “It should be obvious that factual truth and knowledge of it are
important, even if these are not the only things that are important, and even if their importance
does not necessarily trump other valuable attributes.” Schauer, supra note 19, at 901. He
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Asserting that the presence of expert knowledge is good for a
democratic society, however, is somewhat of a controversial statement.
One might equally see it as a threat that results from the inability of
nonexperts to understand, participate in, and control expertise and
expert discourse.249 The problem fundamentally is one of equality.250 To
the extent that democracy depends on the polity’s ability to decide for
themselves what is true, the presence of expert knowledge creates
either an abdication of popular control over expertise or a rejection of
expert knowledge in favor of populism.251 This prompts the question:
“Should the opinions of the many prevail over the knowledge of the
few?”252 The unequal distribution of expert knowledge, moreover, may
invite interventions, such as “egalitarianization through differenceobliterating education or difference-obliterating access to expertise, for
example through state subsidy of experts and the dissemination of their
knowledge and advice.”253
This, in turn, challenges the neutrality of the liberal state.254 The
resulting twin problems are the “character of expert knowledge, which
undermines liberalism, and the problem of the inaccessibility of expert
knowledge to democratic control.”255 Another way to put it: “Should the
political legitimacy of technical decisions in the public domain be
maximized by referring them to the widest democratic processes, or
should such decisions be based on the best expert advice? The first
choice risks technological paralysis: the second invites popular
opposition.”256

elaborates as follows:
Yet, even though we do not accept that truth and knowledge of it have a lexical priority
over all other values, it seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that, in general, truth
is, ceteris paribus, better than falsity, that knowledge is, ceteris paribus, better than
ignorance, and that a society with more true belief is, ceteris paribus, better than one
with less belief in the truth or than one with more beliefs that are actually false.
Id. at 902.
249. Turner, supra note 196, at 123 (“In the writings of persons concerned with the political
threat to democracy posed by the existence of expert knowledge, expertise is treated as a kind of
possession which privileges its possessors with powers that the people cannot successfully control,
and cannot acquire or share in.”).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 124 (describing these alternatives as “the dilemma of capitulation to ‘rule by
experts’ or democratic rule which is ‘populist’—that is to say, that valorizes the wisdom of the
people even when ‘the people’ are ignorant and operate on the basis of fear and rumor”).
252. Collins & Skover, supra note 244, at 372.
253. Turner, supra note 196, at 124.
254. See id. (“Thus it is a violation of the basic neutrality of the state, of the impartiality the
liberal state must exhibit in the face of rival opinions in order to ensure the possibility of genuine,
fair and open discussion.”).
255. Id. at 127.
256. Collins & Evans, supra note 189, at 235–36.
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The First Amendment’s answer to this is to turn expert
knowledge in public discourse into opinion equal to other opinions.257
Does the state’s imprimatur by way of granting a license to
professionals create a problem on the same reasoning? Licensing indeed
creates speaker inequality. But as the normative exploration in the next
Part illustrates, that is actually a good thing.
III. LISTENER INTERESTS, SPEAKER INEQUALITY, AND FIDUCIARY
DUTIES
Two dimensions of First Amendment theory are particularly
relevant to professional advice-giving: the role of listener interests and
the role of speaker inequality. As already noted, both operate in the
opposite direction in public discourse. This Part addresses them in turn.
Moreover, to offer a comprehensive theoretical framing of professional
advice-giving, the discussion of listener interest and speaker inequality
takes fiduciary duties into account. Fiduciary duties respond to
knowledge asymmetries, and the professional-client relationship is a
typical fiduciary relationship.258 As one scholar puts it, “[A] fiduciary
relationship is appropriate when the fiduciary is more expert than the
entrusting party.”259 Though this may initially sound like a circular
argument—a professional is a fiduciary because she is a professional—
the normative dimension proves that it is not. The professional is a

257. See POST, supra note 14, at 44.
258. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 20, at 1207 (explaining that “doctors, lawyers, and
accountants have special relationships of trust and confidence with their clients” and describing
these as “fiduciary relationships”).
Fiduciary theory is on the rise in a wide range of areas. See generally Matthew T. Bodie,
Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819 (2017); Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in
Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993 (2017); Ethan J. Leib, Friends
as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009). In public law, see, for example, Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 441 (2010); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev.
117 (2006); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A
Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); D. Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Voters?, 66 DUKE L.J. 331 (2016);
and D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013). In international
law, see, for example, Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009). With respect to the legal profession, see, for example, David J. Luban
& W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 337 (2017) (identifying fiduciary theory as an area that “may be fruitful for future legal
ethics scholarship”). In the health law context, see, for example, Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the
Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043
(2016); and Margaux J. Hall, A Fiduciary Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1729
(2014).
259. Buck, supra note 258, at 1071.
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fiduciary because the values underlying the relationship demand
imposition of fiduciary duties.
Because fiduciary duties are incompatible with the values
underlying the paradigmatic idea of speech in public discourse, they
remain underexplored in the First Amendment context. One notable
exception is Jack Balkin’s exploration of “information fiduciaries.”260 In
the professional context, focusing on the flow of information from the
professional to the client, we are dealing with “knowledge
fiduciaries.”261 The values underlying the fiduciary relationship track
and reinforce listener interests and speaker inequality in the
professional context; they can thus be seen as normative corollaries.
A. Listener Interests
Conventionally, listener interests are not at the center of
attention in First Amendment theory.262 Though the commercial speech
doctrine was originally concerned with listener interests,263 its primary
focus over time has shifted to the speaker.264 Moreover, the values
underlying professional speech and commercial speech are
fundamentally different.265 But listener interests are vitally important
to professional speech where the very purpose of the professional-client
relationship is to give accurate, comprehensive, and reliable advice to
the client.
Although the listener-centered perspective is not generally
dominant, theoretical and doctrinal support for it does exist “when the
expression occurs within a relationship in which content-based
regulation can help improve the communicative discourse.”266 A
listener’s deficit in “information, expertise, or power” vis-à-vis the
speaker can create a relationship “where the speaker has greater (and
sometimes even exclusive) informational access and listeners’

260. See Balkin, supra note 20, at 1205–20 (introducing the concept of information fiduciaries
and examining fiduciaries and the First Amendment).
261. My focus is on the information the client receives from the professional while Balkin’s is
on the information the professional receives from the client. See id. at 1208. Nonetheless, the
dynamics of the fiduciary relationship are the same.
262. See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text.
263. See Post & Shanor, supra note 7, at 172.
264. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). For an account of the shift in
focus from listener to speaker, see, for example, Shanor, supra note 8.
265. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1264–68 (rejecting the analogy of professional speech to
commercial speech); see also Post, supra note 8, at 23 (“Although the communication between a
professional and her client might concern commercial matters, its regulation would almost
certainly not be conceptualized as an issue of First Amendment commercial speech doctrine.”).
266. Norton, supra note 13, at 37.
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opportunities for counterspeech and exit may be constrained.”267 Among
the examples for speech within such relationships is “speech by
professionals and other fiduciaries to their clients and beneficiaries
where speakers’ insincerity and inaccuracy threaten especially grave
harms to their listeners.”268
Listener interests thus intersect in important ways with
fiduciary duties. Anathema to the concept of public discourse, fiduciary
duties exist between speaker and listener in professional speech: “The
nature of the professional-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary
duties. To bridge the knowledge gap, and to ensure the protection of the
client’s decisional autonomy interests, the professional has to
communicate all information necessary to make an informed decision
to the client.”269
Balkin distinguishes between the content of information and
“the social relationships that produce” information.270 In the
professional speech context, Daniel Halberstam likewise emphasizes
the distinctive social relationship.271 My own approach diverges from
Halberstam’s in the way I conceptualize the nature of expert knowledge
as the formative element of the social relationship.272 Beyond the
“boundedness” of the relationship, the distinctive marker in
Halberstam’s model,273 the content of the underlying knowledge
transfer—that is, accurately and comprehensively conveying the
insights of the knowledge community—matters.274 There is no
fundamental disagreement between these positions; rather, it is a
question of emphasis. Fiduciary duties between professional and client,
however, exist as a key feature of the professional-client relationship
under both approaches.275 In general terms, “a fiduciary is one who has
special obligations of loyalty and trustworthiness toward another

267. Id.
268. Id. (further noting that “relationships matter for free speech purposes in ways that
sometimes support the choice to privilege listeners over speakers when their First Amendment
interests are in tension”).
269. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1271 (citation omitted); cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985)
(speaking of “fiduciary, person-to-person relationships”).
270. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1205.
271. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999).
272. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1243 (“The professional-client relationship is typically
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge.”).
273. Halberstam, supra note 271, at 828–69 (discussing the constitutional status of “bounded
speech practices”).
274. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1267 (arguing that Halberstam’s model of “bounded speech
institutions” is incomplete because it “does not define the content of the boundedness”).
275. Halberstam, supra note 271, at 845; Haupt, supra note 4, at 1271.
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person.”276 In this relationship, “[t]he fiduciary must take care to act in
the interests of the other person” who “puts their trust or confidence in
the fiduciary, and the fiduciary has a duty not to betray that trust or
confidence.”277 This results in the twin fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty: First, fiduciaries “must take care to act competently and
diligently so as not to harm the interests of the principal, beneficiary,
or client.”278 Secondly, they “must keep their clients’ interests in mind
and act in their clients’ interests.”279
Studies of trust in professionals, like studies of professionalism,
have followed an uneven path. Scholars in the healthcare context, for
example, trace a shift from a focus of medical ethics on professionalism
to later scholarship questioning professionals’ trustworthiness.280 This
development maps onto the STS literature’s skepticism of expert
knowledge.281 The axiomatic proposition that “the physician-patient
relationship is expected to be one of mutual trust”282 was followed by an
era marked by skepticism of experts and trust in them. But “[w]e are
now witnessing a robust revival of trust as a topic in discussions of
medical ethics and professionalism.”283 Views of trust in professional
relationships are also influenced by the conception of the market in
professional services where the position “that optimal levels of trust or
distrust will emerge through private ordering, without the assistance
of law,” competes with the position “that trust is preferable to extensive
monitoring and that certain legal regimes are needed to maximize the
beneficial role of trust.”284 These positions mirror the competing
economic positions on licensing.285
Not all fiduciaries are professionals, as the corporate context
shows.286 Although fiduciary duties exist between management and
shareholders, there is no professional advice-giving relationship.287
Closer to the line might be the trustee-beneficiary relationship, another
paradigmatic fiduciary relationship. Finally, financial advisors—
276. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1207.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1207–08.
279. Id. at 1208.
280. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 469 (2002).
281. See supra Section II.B.
282. Hall, supra note 280, at 469 n.18 (citing TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 463–65
(1951)).
283. Id. at 469.
284. Id. at 484.
285. See supra Section I.B.3.
286. Cf. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1207 (“Fiduciaries often perform professional services or else
manage money or property for their principals, beneficiaries, or clients.”).
287. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligations, 37 DUKE
L.J. 879, 915–18 (1988) (examining fiduciary duties in corporate law).
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fiduciaries in light of the new fiduciary rule288—likely cross the line into
the professional advice-giving realm.289 And the attorney-client
relationship,290 like the doctor-patient relationship,291 is a paradigmatic
professional-client relationship giving rise to fiduciary duties.
But just as not all fiduciaries are professionals, not all
professionals are fiduciaries. The medical context usefully illustrates
contemporary debates concerning the existence and scope of
professionals’ fiduciary duties. Under one account, based on “the
existence of trust as a factual premise,” the law attaches specific rules
to the relationship.292 Thus, the “various rights, responsibilities, and
rules are premised on the strength and pervasiveness of trust in
medical relationships.”293 Building on the patient’s trust in
professionals and institutions, “the law seeks to enforce or promote
physician or institutional behavior that meets the expectations that
trusting patients bring to treatment relationships, and the law
punishes violations of those trusting expectations.”294 Normatively, it
thus seeks to ensure that professionals and institutions act more in
accordance with patient expectations.295 One way to distinguish among
professionals is to ask about the trust the public typically places in them
as a matter of fiduciary duty; another is to ask the same question with
respect to the existence of a regime of professional malpractice
liability.296 Both aim to ensure that trust in professionals is met by their
behavior.

288. Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama’s Fiduciary Rule, After a Delay, Will Go Into Effect, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2qTorEg [https://perma.cc/527Y-3QQA]; see Definition of the
Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946
(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550).
289. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Now, Your Financial Advisers Will Have to Put You First
(Sometimes), N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2sZRcxc [https://perma.cc/QC39-RB7X]
(“When a doctor prescribes a drug, most people trust that it is the best course of treatment. The
next time you seek financial advice, those professionals will be required to act in a way that
approximates the patient-doctor relationship.”).
290. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 287, at 908 (“Paradigms of such [fiduciary] relationships
include agent-principal, director-corporation, guardian-ward, lawyer-client, partner-fellow
partner, and trustee-trust beneficiary relationships.”).
291. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015) (noting that physicians “have greater knowledge and experience” than their
patients). For a list of court decisions holding that physicians are fiduciaries, see id. at 3 n.5.
292. Hall, supra note 280, at 486.
293. Id. at 487.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Without getting too far into current controversies in fiduciary theory, it is worth noting
that there is some debate over “whether the duty of care and skill owed by a fiduciary is properly
called a fiduciary duty.” Lionel Smith, Aspects of Loyalty 1 (July 27, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009894 [https://perma.cc/47UF-N5H8].
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The presence of both fiduciary duties and professional
malpractice liability has interesting conceptual implications. Courts
and scholars treat tort liability and breach of fiduciary duty in different
ways. Most importantly for present purposes, the two regimes are
concerned with different categories of harm.297 Whereas the malpractice
regime is concerned with bad advice, the fiduciary regime addresses
betrayals of trust, and although the duty of care to act competently may
be duplicative of the duty imposed by the professional malpractice
standard, the two categories do not necessarily overlap.298 In the end,
despite the fact that some courts doubt the fiduciary relationship or
allow only a cause of action for malpractice but not for breach of
fiduciary duty, the doctor-patient relationship should not be a hard case
as far as fiduciary duties are concerned.299
The listener’s interests extend to both the content of advice—
that is, its accuracy as determined by the professional knowledge
community—and the ability to rely on that advice—that is, the
trustworthiness of the professional dispensing that advice. Thus, the
normative goals align: ensuring the professional’s competence and the
client’s trust in the professional’s competence are at the heart of the
professional-client relationship.
B. Speaker Inequality
Though equal in public discourse, speakers are necessarily—and
appropriately—unequal in the professional relationship. One marker of
inequality is the tort regime imposing liability for bad advice. Such a
liability mechanism is absent in public discourse. Recall that in public
discourse “traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically
transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”300 As
a consequence, though listeners may be more likely to trust a
professional than a nonprofessional on a matter to which expertise may
be relevant,301 they do not have the same recourse for harm caused by
bad advice.302 This also means that professionals are free to diverge
297. They also differ with respect to the distribution of the burden of proof and the available
remedies. See Mehlman, supra note 291, at 28.
298. See Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 557, 565 (2009) (“Trust and loyalty are what distinguish fiduciary from non-fiduciary
relationships.”).
299. See Mehlman, supra note 291, at 10 (noting with surprise the authorities “that cast doubt
on or reject outright the fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship”).
300. POST, supra note 14, at 44.
301. Cf. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1256.
302. See Haupt, supra note 10, at 681–82 (discussing medical advice dispensed to a general
audience by a physician on a television program).
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from what the profession considers good advice—something they may
not do within the confines of the professional-client relationship.303
Fiduciary duties normatively address the inequality between
advice-giver and advice-recipient by aligning the professional’s
behavior with the client’s expectations.304 While everyone is “treated as
equally competent and equally able to fend for themselves in public
discourse,” outside of public discourse, “the law drops its assumption
that everyone is equally able, independent, and knowledgeable, and
that everyone can equally fend for themselves.”305 This type of speaker
inequality accounts for the knowledge asymmetry between professional
and client. But there is another kind of speaker inequality: that
between the professional speaker and the nonprofessional speaker.
Individuals cannot place the same reliance on advice given by
nonprofessional speakers, and they cannot hold them liable for harm
caused by bad advice. Licensing provides a mechanism to make this
distinction readable ex ante. Even outside of public discourse, in
relationships that might look like advice-giving relationships,
individuals cannot usually place the same reliance on nonprofessional
advice
obtained
through
one-on-one
relationships
with
nonprofessionals, though context matters. On this point, it is
instructive to contrast conversion therapy with advice dispensed in
crisis pregnancy centers (“CPCs”).
After the Ninth Circuit upheld California’s law prohibiting
licensed mental health providers from offering conversion therapy, or
“sexual orientation change efforts,” for minors against a First
Amendment challenge under the Free Speech Clause,306 the same court
denied a challenge under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
brought by licensed individuals who wanted to offer this type of
treatment as a form of religious counseling.307 The court noted that the
law applies only to “licensed mental health professionals acting within
the confines of the counselor-client relationship.”308 In addition to the
text, the legislative history supports this conclusion as “the law was
aimed at practices that occur in the course of acting as a licensed
professional.”309 According to the court, only the counselor-client
relationship is within the law’s ambit: “The law regulates the conduct
of state-licensed mental health providers only; the conduct of all other
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 681.
See supra notes 292–295 and accompanying text.
Balkin, supra note 20, at 1215.
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).
Welch v. Brown, 834 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1044 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229–30).
Id.
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persons, such as religious leaders not acting as state-licensed mental
health provider, is unaffected.”310 Further, the court noted that “even
the conduct of state-licensed mental health providers is regulated only
within the confines of the counselor-client relationship; in all other
areas of life, such as religious practices, the law simply does not
apply.”311 The professional speaker, in short, is unequal from other
speakers, and licensing signals this difference. Obtaining advice from
an individual outside of the professional-client relationship may be a
form of advice, but it is not professional advice.312
But the social relationship may be configured so as to evoke trust
and reliance in a way that ought to only apply in a professional-client
relationship. In obtaining advice from CPC counselors, women are
sometimes led to believe they can rely on advice rendered there in the
same way as medical advice.313 To avoid harm caused by such reliance,
California enacted legislation that required CPCs to display certain
disclosures.314 The law regulated licensed and unlicensed pregnancycounseling facilities. Specifically, it required licensed pregnancyrelated clinics to disseminate a notice informing patients of the
existence of publicly-funded family-planning services, including
contraception and abortion,315 and that the clinic was not licensed by
the state of California.316 CPCs may be licensed or unlicensed
facilities.317 The Ninth Circuit upheld the law against a First
Amendment challenge,318 but in its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, the
310. Id. at 1045 (emphasis omitted). I have elsewhere criticized the Pickup court for
characterizing the speech as “conduct.” See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1294 (“Under my account, the
activity regulated by the SOCE legislation . . . is speech. But as professional speech, it is a specific
kind of speech.”). This disagreement, however, does not impact the role of licensing in the court’s
analysis in Welch.
311. Welch, 834 F.3d at 1045.
312. There are, of course, line-drawing problems associated with this conceptual stance. I have
elsewhere addressed the fact that knowledge communities are not monolithic, and often there is
more than one professional opinion that is acceptable as professional advice. See Haupt, supra note
10, at 675. Another problem concerns the line between different disciplines and professions with
overlapping expertise on certain matters.
313. See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy
Centers, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 51, 54;
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1350 (2014) (“Women
who . . . are administered pregnancy tests by people in white lab coats are led to believe that
medical professionals will give them accurate and impartial medical advice.”); B. Jessie Hill, Casey
Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 59, 66 (noting that “[t]he
counseling transaction itself looks like . . . [a] one-on-one, fiduciary relationship”).
314. Reproductive FACT Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473 (West 2016).
315. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 828–29 (9th Cir. 2016),
rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
316. Id. at 829.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 845.
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Supreme Court subsequently held the statute as drafted
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.319
Two questions that were conflated in the NIFLA litigation by
assuming the CPC disclosures were professional speech have to be kept
separate. First, whether the speech in question is itself professional
speech. (I have argued elsewhere that it is not.320) The second question
is whether the state has a sufficient interest in informing women about
the nature of the services rendered by CPCs. The normative relevance
of both questions is that professional advice-giving both evokes and
depends on client trust. The client must be able to trust that the
professional gives competent, accurate, and comprehensive advice
consistent with the insights of the knowledge community.
Distinguishing between licensed and unlicensed providers accounts for
the level of trust patients can reasonably place in the advice obtained.
The NIFLA dissent correctly understands the role of licensing as an
element of the larger regulatory framework governing professional
advice-giving.321 Similarly, the professional malpractice tort regime and
fiduciary duties impose real consequences on some speakers and not
others, making inequality among speakers legally relevant by tying
advice to a body of professional knowledge generated by the knowledge
community.
Speaker inequality as a normative matter, then, accounts for
expert knowledge situated with advice-giving professionals whose
competence licensing makes a prerequisite that is readable ex ante, and
whose liability for bad advice ex post is ensured through professional
malpractice liability and who are bound to further client interests by
fiduciary duties. Thus normatively, in the end, the interests underlying
all of them align.

319. 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
320. Claudia Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 185, 189 (2018):
In classifying the CPC disclosures as professional speech, the Ninth Circuit defined
professional speech too broadly. The content of the disclosures in NIFLA was too far
removed from expert knowledge to be properly attributed to the realm of professional
expertise. The disclosures dealt with publicly funded reproductive healthcare and state
licensing, regulatory frameworks that are not themselves subject to expert knowledge.
321. 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting):
Even during the Lochner era, when this Court struck down numerous economic
regulations concerning industry, this Court was careful to defer to state legislative
judgments concerning the medical profession. The Court took the view that a State may
condition the practice of medicine on any number of requirements, and physicians, in
exchange for following those reasonable requirements, could receive a license to practice
medicine from the State. Medical professionals do not, generally speaking, have a right
to use the Constitution as a weapon allowing them rigorously to control the content of
those reasonable conditions.
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IV. RETHINKING PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Having argued that professional speech protection and
professional licensing are complementary rather than in conflict, this
Part addresses how this theory of professional speech and professional
licensing cashes out in terms of First Amendment doctrine before
surveying the reconceptualized legal framework governing professional
advice-giving and its application.
This Part then returns briefly to professional licensing reform.
There may be good reasons yet to question currently existing
professional licensing regimes. Simultaneously acknowledging the
shortcomings of existing licensing regimes and recognizing the abstract
need for licensing in general are not incompatible. But rather than
attempting to alter licensing regulation through a First Amendment
lens based on the theoretically feeble assertion that speech protection
and licensing are irreconcilable, rethinking professional licensing
should focus on the states’ police powers. Licensing ought to be tailored
so as to protect clients’ health, safety, and welfare by ensuring
professionals’ competence.
A. Professionals and the First Amendment
Professional speech is a unique category of speech.322 It is not
the expression of opinions in public discourse, nor is it commercial
speech. Professional speech reflects the shared knowledge of
professionals belonging to a knowledge community that is
communicated from professional to client within the confines of a
professional-client relationship. Several implications for First
Amendment doctrine and for the legal framework of professional
advice-giving that change the analysis of professional speech and
licensing cases follow from this theory, as this Section will demonstrate.
1. Doctrinal Implications
Under this theory of professional speech, several First
Amendment doctrines applicable in public discourse do not apply in the
context of professional speech. The requirements of content and
viewpoint neutrality under Reed v. Town of Gilbert323 are inapplicable,
322. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1269. But see Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech Is Not “Speech,”
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 882 (2017) (arguing against First Amendment coverage of professional speech
but noting that “[t]he coverage problem here is much more complex and debatable than in . . . other
examples”); Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV.
67 (2016) (arguing against a distinctive approach to professional speech).
323. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
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as is protection of false speech under United States v. Alvarez.324
Moreover, in the professional speech context, there are justifications for
prohibiting false and misleading speech, for imposing an informed
consent requirement, and for compelled disclosures. And finally, prior
restraint doctrine does not apply. I will briefly discuss these doctrinal
consequences in turn.
Content and viewpoint neutrality are inapposite to professional
speech.325 The Eleventh Circuit most recently disregarded the
fundamental difference between public discourse and professional
speech in its en banc decision in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida.326
Despite reaching the correct result in striking down on First
Amendment grounds a Florida law that prohibited doctors from asking
their patients about gun ownership as a matter of course, the analytical
approach applying the requirement of content neutrality327 misses the
distinctive nature of professional speech. Rather, “in order to preserve
the values underlying professional speech—ensuring the accuracy and
reliability of professional advice for the benefit of the client who
depends on it to make important decisions—the First Amendment may
not require state regulation to ignore the content of that advice.”328 The
client, in short, depends on a distinction between good and bad
professional advice—a distinction that a strict regime of content and
viewpoint neutrality would obliterate. But “the value of professional
speech to the client critically depends on its content.”329 The tort regime
of professional malpractice liability, to take a particularly salient
example, is based on the content of speech, and the First Amendment
provides no defense against malpractice claims.330 Thus, “content
regulation . . . ensure[s] that professionals give their clients, to whom
they owe a fiduciary duty, comprehensive and accurate advice.”331 On
the same reasoning, lies as well as false and misleading speech do not
enjoy First Amendment protection in the context of professional
speech.332
324. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
325. Haupt, supra note 163, at 151.
326. 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
327. Id. at 1300 (framing the decision in terms of content neutrality).
328. Haupt, supra note 163, at 152.
329. Id. at 172.
330. Even the NIFLA majority agrees, though it argued that this is because professional
malpractice is conduct. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2373 (2018) (noting that torts for professional malpractice fall under the state’s purview to
regulate professional conduct).
331. Haupt, supra note 163, at 172.
332. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); cf. Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (explaining that the state can require
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With respect to informed consent, “imposing an informed
consent requirement does not technically restrict the professional’s
First Amendment rights if appropriate disclosure is considered a part
of medically necessary information flow within the doctor-patient
relationship.”333 Scholars continue to explore the margins of what the
state can require as a matter of informed consent.334 However, in light
of the underlying interests, informed consent is necessary for the
patient’s decisional autonomy. Thus, unlike in public discourse, the
imposition of such a requirement is justified.335
In public discourse, compelled disclosure requirements are
strongly disfavored “because such requirements are understood to
infringe the autonomy of speakers in determining the content of their
speech.”336 But in the professional speech context, autonomy interests
operate differently than in public discourse: “The professional not only
speaks for herself, but also as a member of a learned profession” which
leads to “a unique autonomy interest in communicating her message
according to the standards of the profession.”337 Consequently,
compelled disclosures in the professional speech context do not
implicate the same values as in public discourse.
Finally, a strong presumption against prior restraints on speech
is a hallmark of public discourse.338 As already mentioned, the question
of prior restraints created by professional licensing is the subject of
considerable disagreement. Whereas the Ninth Circuit denied that
licensing creates prior restraints,339 some scholars assert that licensing
creates particularly troublesome prior restraints.340 But neither of those
positions accurately captures the relationship between prior restraints
and licensing. First Amendment scholars have long examined the
values served by prior restraint doctrine.341 The central concern is
that truthful and not misleading information be provided without running afoul of the First
Amendment).
333. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1289.
334. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 313; Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939; Nadia N. Sawicki,
Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2016); Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in
Reproductive Decision Making, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 22.
335. As it does with professional malpractice, the NIFLA majority considers informed consent
a form of conduct. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
336. Post, supra note 8, at 27.
337. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1272.
338. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
339. See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409
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suppression of speech.342 But bad professional advice is properly
suppressed, since it serves neither the client’s or patient’s nor the
professional’s interests.343 The malpractice regime sanctions bad advice
ex post, but ex ante suppression of speech equally furthers the values
underlying the professional-client relationship. In other words,
suppression of incompetent advice is normatively desirable in the
professional context. And a licensing regime tailored to the goal of
ensuring competent advice-giving serves this interest.
2. The Framework of Professional Advice-Giving
Because professional speech protection and professional
licensing share the same goal—ensuring the availability of competent
and reliable advice for clients or patients—state involvement in
licensing supports the framework of professional advice-giving rather
than undermines it. Key components of this framework are First
Amendment protection of professional speech, professional malpractice
liability, fiduciary duties within the professional-client relationship,
and the permissibility of professional licensing.344
The entire regulatory framework has the goal of ensuring the
flow of accurate and comprehensive advice from the knowledge
community through the individual professional to the client.345 To that
end, the First Amendment protects only good advice as determined by
the standards of the profession, taking into account that a range of
knowledge may constitute good advice.346 Professional speech
protection and professional malpractice liability thus form two sides of
the same coin.347
From the perspective of the client, the tort regime provides
recourse for harm caused by bad advice.348 In this scenario, the First
Amendment and the tort regime draw on the same body of
knowledge.349 This conceptual point is relatively simple, but important:
“Professionals may be held liable for ‘unprofessional’ speech—that is,

(1983); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
342. Post, supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)).
343. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1270–73 (discussing professional and decisional autonomy
interests).
344. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1279 .
345. See id. at 1267.
346. Haupt, supra note 10, at 675.
347. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1285.
348. See Haupt, supra note 10, at 707–10 .
349. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1279.

Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

556

3/31/2019 1:27 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2:501

speech within the professional-client relationship, for the purpose of
providing professional advice, that fails accurately to communicate the
knowledge community’s insights.”350 This understanding is also
consistent with contemporary torts scholarship.351
Connecting disciplinary truth and malpractice liability in a
sense is distinctly Foucauldian: “Discipline is on the one hand ‘the
maintenance of a set of rules and the punishment meted out for their
infringement.’ But at the same time it is also ‘a branch of
knowledge.’ ”352 Professional speech protection and the imposition of
malpractice liability are complementary.353 Only good advice ought to
be protected by the First Amendment, and only bad advice is subject to
malpractice liability. Fiduciary duties lend normative support to the
design of the professional-client relationship. But this legal framework
does not obviate the need for licensing. Most obviously, the temporal
aspect is fundamentally different: licensing happens ex ante, tort
liability ex post. In order for a tort claim to succeed, the client must
have suffered harm. Licensing, by contrast, anticipates the abstract
possibility of harm.354
Assessing the likelihood and potential extent of harm is a
necessarily fact-specific and profession-specific inquiry. In National
Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, the Ninth Circuit
discussed harm to clients in its rational basis analysis.355 The court
noted that the state “first regulated psychology because it ‘recognized
the actual and potential consumer harm that can result from the
unlicensed, unqualified or incompetent practice of psychology.’ ”356 It
then examined the law’s provisions in relation to potential harms that
may arise in the course of practice, concluding that “[r]egulating
psychology, and through it psychoanalysis, is rational because it is
within the state’s police power to regulate mental health treatment.”357
Similarly, scholars of the legal profession call for a focus on harm when
350. Id. at 1278–79.
351. See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1206
(2012).
352. Thomas Broman, Rethinking Professionalization: Theory, Practice, and Professional
Ideology in Eighteenth-Century German Medicine, 67 J. MOD. HIST. 835, 837 (1995) (quoting Jan
Goldstein, Foucault Among the Sociologists: The ‘Disciplines’ and the History of the Professions, 23
HIST. & THEORY 170, 178 (1984)).
353. See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1285 (discussing First Amendment protection and malpractice
liability as two sides of the same coin).
354. But see Svorny, supra note 185 (arguing that instead of protecting patients, licensing
increases the power of physicians to the detriment of patient care).
355. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000).
356. Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2900 (West 2018)).
357. Id.
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considering “full-scale licensing structures,” suggesting that they “are
desirable only when harms are ‘demonstrated or easily
recognizable.’ ”358
B. Professional Licensing Reform
It may well be desirable to refashion licensing regimes to
establish a more immediate nexus between licensing and competence,
with the goal of preventing harm to clients.359 But theoretically and
doctrinally speaking, the First Amendment is not the way to get there.
The states’ police powers, by contrast, provide a sound route toward a
tighter fit between the regulatory regime and the potential harm to be
averted. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in National Ass’n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis provides one example.360 The D.C. tour
guide case—though misguided in its First Amendment lens—illustrates
this approach,361 which was also endorsed by the district court in the
Charleston tour guide case.362 But fashioning a closer nexus between
licensing and harm, to reiterate, is unrelated to First Amendment
concerns.
A focus on the interplay of harm, the level of professional
competence necessary to avoid it, and the demands of licensing
requirements would likely result in a redesign of various existing
regimes. As one commentator notes: “Because the use of occupational
licensing varies across states for the same occupation, the large
variations in licensing requirements suggest that this form of
regulation is not always strictly related with safety or quality concerns
over individuals’ ability to do the tasks related to the occupation.” 363
Redesigning or better tailoring can potentially provide significant relief

358. Rhode, supra note 243, at 96 (quoting BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, BARBARA F. ESSER & DANIEL
H. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 222 (1973)).
359. Cf. Bell, supra note 61, at 128 (suggesting that states should “promulgate substantive
regulations that are reasonably related to braiding and natural styling”).
360. See supra notes 356–357 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
363. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 11:
For example, only seven states license dental assistants and thirteen states license
locksmiths. Even for states that do license the same occupation, the requirements to
obtain a license can vary widely. Iowa requires 490 days of education and training to
become a licensed cosmetologist, but the national average is 372 days, and New York
and Massachusetts require only 233 days. Training requirements also are frequently
unrelated to issues of health and public safety. To illustrate, training requirements in
Michigan take 1,460 days for an athletic trainer, but only twenty-six days for an
emergency medical technician.

Haupt_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

558

3/31/2019 1:27 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2:501

to the problem. But it would be up to state legislatures in the first
instance to act.
Critics of licensing suggest a range of “market” instruments that
would replace licensure with solutions ranging from voluntary
certification to customer review and ratings systems akin to Yelp.364
Certification involves an exam and subsequent certification of a specific
level of skill or knowledge by a government agency or private actor.365
And as an even less restrictive alternative, registration requires
application to be included in an official roster.366
For some occupations, this might make good sense—but some
proposals go too far. In the medical context, one economist asserts: “The
premise that patients’ health and safety are protected by state medical
professional licensing is without basis. Instead, patients are protected
by private credentialing, privileging, certification, brand name, medical
professional liability insurance oversight, and other efforts to reduce
liability.”367 However, as the previous discussion has shown, the
medical example is particularly unlikely to provide a suitable basis to
argue for deregulation since professional advice-giving is a core element
of the doctor-patient relationship and there is a significant risk of
causing considerable harm.368 A reliable ex ante mechanism of
distinguishing competent from incompetent advice may not be
necessary for all occupations, but it is necessary for healthcare
364. See id. at 21–22 (proposing that certification should substitute licensing for some
occupations); Kry, supra note 7, at 891 (arguing for certification). The D.C. Circuit in the tour
guides case concluded that “fatal to the District’s regulatory scheme is the existence of less
restrictive means to accomplish its interests.” Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1009. Among those
alternatives would be “a voluntary certification program—under which guides who take and pass
the District’s preferred exam can advertise as ‘city-certified guides.’ ” Id. The district court in the
Charleston tour guide case likewise contemplated various alternatives to licensing, including
“reliance on the free-market, particularly given the public’s use of travel review websites” and “a
voluntary certification program,” Billups, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 470, but ultimately dismissed these
alternatives as insufficient. Id. at 477–78.
365. Kleiner, supra note 26, at 8:
For instance, in many states travel agents and car mechanics are certified but not
licensed. This process allows for competition for services, as anyone can legally perform
the work, but it protects the right of the title for those in the occupation. For example,
only workers who have passed through a Chartered Financial Analyst program and
exam can use that title, but others can provide financial advice for a fee as long as they
do not use the title “chartered financial analyst.”
366. Id.
367. Svorny, Beyond Medical Licensure, supra note 60, at 29; see also Sawicki, supra note 76,
at 287 n.7:
Economists, in particular, have long made similar arguments, questioning the value of
licensure and self-regulation in highly insulated and self-protective professions, like
medicine. These authors and others suggest that medical quality and patient safety
could be better safeguarded through market-based solutions that close the information
gap between physicians and consumers.
368. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
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providers. Thus, “it is highly unlikely that the current system of medical
licensure would be abandoned in the foreseeable future.”369
The same is likely true for the legal profession, despite the fact
that prominent scholars have contemplated alternatives to licensing.
Rhode, for example, explores voluntary certification or mandatory
registration.370 In addition, she raises the possibility that “a state could
grant licenses to all lay practitioners who registered with an
appropriate agency.”371 But to the extent that these alternatives are
offered to avoid conflict with the First Amendment, this discussion has
demonstrated that this particular concern is largely unfounded.
CONCLUSION
Building on a concept of the professions as knowledge
communities, this Article demonstrates that the interests underlying
professional speech protection and professional licensing align. Both
professional speech protection and professional licensing, properly
conceptualized, ultimately share the goal of guarding the integrity of
professional knowledge—as defined by the knowledge community—
communicated by the professional to the client for the client’s benefit.
The central role of listener interests and speaker inequality
distinguishes professional speech from speech in public discourse.
These interests are reflected in the fiduciary duties that exist between
professional and client.
The First Amendment, it turns out, is a poor vehicle to challenge
professional licensing regimes. Consequently, courts should reject novel
litigation strategies seeking to enlist the First Amendment in
deregulation of professional licensing. There may be good reasons to
oppose licensing for some occupations, but asserting a violation of the
First Amendment is not one of them.

369. Sawicki, supra note 76, at 287 n.7.
370. Rhode, supra note 243, at 96.
371. Id.

